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THE RISING BAR FOR
PERSECUTION IN ASYLUM CASES
INVOLVING SEXUAL AND
REPRODUCTIVE HARM
FATMA E. MAROUF*
Abstract
This Article argues that there is a rising bar for
establishingpersecution in U.S. asylum cases involving sexual
and reproductive' harm. Analyzing recent cases, the Article
shows that adjudicators tend to apply a higher standardfor
physical harm in these types of cases and largely overlook
nonphysical harm, including psychological suffering and the
intangible harm caused by deprivation of equality, autonomy,
and privacy. The Article focuses specifically on two types of
cases where these patternsappear: (1)female genital mutilation
(FGM); and (2) involuntary insertion of an intrauterine device
(IUD). Regarding FGM, the Article discusses an emerging
dispute as to whether Type I FGM (clitoridectomy) constitutes
persecution. With respect to involuntary IUDs, the Article
analyzes a decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA)
requiring aggravating circumstancesfor the harm to constitute
persecution, as well as recent circuit court decisions reviewing
the applicationof this problematicprecedent to other cases. The
Article then argues that using internationalhuman rights law to
identify and evaluate various types of harm would lead to a
much more comprehensive and principled analysis of
persecution and would likely lead to different results in these
types of cases.
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INTRODUCTION
The concept of persecution lies at the heart of what it
means to be a refugee,1 yet its definition remains highly
imprecise. Judges define what actions constitute persecution on
a case-by-case basis without reference to any objective norms or
standards, resulting in significant discrepancies between the
federal courts of appeal, as well as striking inconsistencies at

* Associate Professor of Law, University of Nevada, Las Vegas. J.D.,
Harvard Law School; B.A. Yale University and to my'colleagueMichael Kagan,
for his careful eye. Deepest thanks to Deborah Anker for her inspiration and
mentorship over the years. I would also like to thank the staff of the COLUMBIA
JOURNAL OF GENDER AND LAW for their thoughtful comments and edits to this
piece.

I A refugee or asylee is defined as someone who is outside his or her
country of nationality and who can demonstrate "persecution or a well-founded
fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion." Immigration and Nationality Act, 8
U.S.C.A. § I101(a)(42)(A) (West 2011). This definition in the U.S. statute adopts
the definition of a refugee in the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of
Refugees, which incorporates Articles 2 through 34 of the 1951 Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees.1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of
Refugees, art.I, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267; Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees, art. 1, opened for signature July 28, 1951,
189 U.N.T.S. 150 [hereinafter 1951 Convention].
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lower levels of adjudication. 2 When it comes to nonphysical
forms of harm, such as psychological harm, severe
discrimination, or deprivation of self-determination, the
divergence of opinion is even greater.
Over time, our understanding of persecution has evolved to
encompass forms of harm that are related to gender and
experienced primarily by women, such as rape, female genital
mutilation (FGM), and domestic violence. As Deborah Anker
has argued, "the [United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR)], practitioners,. scholars and activists
consciously have constructed gender asylum law on the edifice
of international women's human rights law and the work of the
Judges,
international women's human rights movement." 3
however, often continue to view gender-specific forms of harm
through a different lens. Thus, while great progress has been
made over the past two decades in recognizing gender-related
asylum claims, "we are still a long way from an adequate
recognition of the specificity of women's experiences of

2 Applications for asylum can be made affirmatively to an Asylum Office
or defensively in immigration court, after a person has been placed in removal
proceedings. If the Asylum Office does not grant asylum, it generally refers the
case to immigration court, and the immigration judge makes a de novo ruling on
the case. Immigration judges are career civil servants in the Department of
Justice. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(b)(4) (West 2011) (stating that an immigration judge
is "an attorney whom the Attomey General appoints as an administrative judge
within the Executive Office for Immigration Review"). Over two-hundred and
thirty-five immigration judges conduct administrative removal proceedings in
fifty-nine immigration courts nationwide. The Board of Immigration Appeals in
Falls Church, Virginia has jurisdiction over appeals from certain decisions of
immigration judges throughout the United States, including asylum
determinations. The BIA applies a "clearly erroneous" standard of review for
factual findings by immigration judges and a de novo standard of review for all
questions of law and discretion. 8 C.F.R. § 3. 1(d)(3) (West 2011); Matter of SH-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 462, 464 (BIA 2002).The BIA is composed of about fifteen
members, who are also "attorneys appointed by the Attorney General." 8 C.F.R.
§ 1003.1(a)(2). The BIA's determinations in asylum cases may then be appealed
to the U.S. Courts of Appeal. The location of the immigration court that issues
the initial decision determines which circuit court has jurisdiction over the
appeal.

3 Deborah E. Anker, Refugee Law, Gender and the Human Rights
Paradigm, 15 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 133, 138-39 (2002).
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persecution, as is the case for many other non-traditional forms
of persecution.' 4
This Article focuses on two types of sexual and
reproductive harm about which opinions have begun to diverge.
The first type of harm, FGM, which affects 100 to 140 million
girls and women worldwide, 5 was found to constitute
persecution years ago by the Board of Immigration Appeals
(BIA) in Matter of Kasinga.6 During the past decade, most
circuit courts, as well as many other countries, have agreed that
FGM constitutes persecution. 7 Recent decisions, however,
indicate that the BIA and some circuit courts might not consider
all forms of FGM to be persecution. Specifically, there are early
signs of as to whether Type I FGM (clitoridectomy), w'hich is
one of the two most common forms of the practice, rises to the
level of persecution. 8 In addition, a recent decision by the BIA
suggests that FGM requires aggravating factors to constitute
severe past persecution, which allows for a grant of

4 Ekaterina Yahyaoui Krivenko, Muslim Women s Claims to Refugee
Status Within the Context of Child Custody Upon Divorce Under Islamic Law, 22
INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 48, 49 (2010); see also HEAVEN CRAWLEY, REFUGEES AND
GENDER: LAW AND PROCESS (2001) (reporting that women asylum-seekers in the
UK did not benefit equitably from the protections offered by the 1951 Refugee
Convention because their experiences were marginalized by decision-makers'
interpretations of the Convention, and procedural and evidential barriers
impeded their claims).
5 Secretariat of the U.N. World Health Org., Female Genital Mutilation:
Rep. of the Secretariat, U.N. Doc. EBI22/15 (Jan. 10, 2008) [hereinafter WHO:
Female GenitalMutilation].
6 In re Kasinga, 21 1. & N. Dec. 357, 365 (BIA 1996) (en banc).
7See infra note 59.
8 See infra Part II.A for discussion of the emerging Circuit split;
Frequently Asked Questions About Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting, UNITED
NATIONS POPULATION FUND, http://www.unfpa.org/gender/practices2.htm#3 (last
visited Sept. 7, 2011) [hereinafter UNFPA] ("Types I and II are the most
common, with variation among countries. Type Ill, infibulation, constitutes
about twenty percent of all affected women and is most likely in Somalia,
northern Sudan and Djibouti."). For simplicity, this Article refers to the practice
of Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting as "FGM".
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humanitarian asylum without showing a well-founded fear of
future persecution. 9
The second type of harm that the Article addresses is
involuntary insertion of an intrauterine device ("IUD"), which
China inflicts on millions of women as part of its population
control policies.' 0 After the appearance of many conflicting,
unpublished decisions on this issue, the Second Circuit
remanded a case to the BIA specifically requesting a
precedential opinion on point. I"The BIA responded with Matter
of M-F-W-& L-G-, which held that "aggravating circumstances"
were required for involuntary insertion of the IUD to amount to
persecution. 12 While the BIA did not define "aggravating
circumstances," its decision suggests that significant pain or
multiple insertions would be required for the harm to amount to
persecution.
These two lines of cases involving sexual and reproductive
harm highlight several problems. First, in assessing physical
harm related to women's sexual and reproductive functions,
adjudicators tend to apply a higher standard for persecution than
for other types of physical harm. Instead of comparing the harm
at issue to an objective standard for persecution, they compare it
to the most extreme form of the relevant cultural practice, such
as Type III FGM (infibulation) or forced sterilization. The
Article notes that this tendency may be due, at least in part, to a
specific type of cognitive bias, known as contrast bias, on the
part of adjudicators.
In addition, 'adjudicators fail to analyze the nonphysical
harm that results from practices such as FGM and involuntary
insertion of an IUD, including psychological suffering, gender
9 Matter of S-A-K- & H-A-H-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 464 (BIA 2008).
10As discussed in Part Il.B.2 below, a 2001 survey showed that 46% of
women in China use IUDs and 38.1% have been sterilized. By comparison, only
5. 1% of Chinese men use condoms and only 7.9% have been sterilized. See infra
notes 241-42 and accompanying text. The number of forced IUDs is, of course,
nearly impossible to determine.
I Zheng v. Gonzales, 497 F.3d 201, 203-04 (2d Cir. 2007).
12Matter of M-F-W- & L-G-, 24 1.& N. Dec. 633, 642 (BIA 2008).
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discrimination, deprivation of self-determination, and profound
invasions of privacy. Even where the physical procedure is short
and does not result in medical complications, this type of
nonphysical harm is discriminatory in nature and has serious,
long-term effects that should not be forgotten. The tendency to
ignore nonphysical harm clouds not only the analysis of
persecution but also the evaluation of "aggravating
circumstances," to the extent that consideration of such
circumstances may be relevant. In pointing out these issues, the
Article touches on the ways that implicit bias may also help
explain why the analysis of physical harm dominates the
decisions.
In Part III, the Article argues that conceptualizing
persecution as a serious violation of human rights and evaluating
the harms at issue under international human rights law will lead
to a much more comprehensive, consistent, and equitable
analysis of persecution. Applying an international human rights
law analysis, the Article demonstrates that all forms of FGM, as
well as involuntary insertion of.an IUD, amount to persecution.
The Article then discusses why an international human rights
approach is superior to both an approach that focuses on
violations of fundamental rights under U.S. constitutional law
and an approach that creates a bifurcated standard for addressing
physical and nonphysical harm, as in tort law.
Finally, the Article concludes that the circuit courts must
grapple seriously with the question of how best to analyze
persecution in cases involving gender-related harm. Precedential
decisions will likely become necessary not only on the two
issues discussed here, but also on a range of other complex
issues that either mingle physical and nonphysical harm or
involve nonphysical harm alone, such as forced marriages or
draconian family laws that affect women's rights to divorce and
custody of children.
In 2010, the United States received 55,500 asylum
applications, maintaining its status as the single largest recipient
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of asylum claims among industrialized nations. 13 The two issues
highlighted in this Article-involuntary insertions of IUDs and
FGM-are particularly relevant because they pertain to
countries that play a significant role in our asylum process.
Chinese asylum-seekers accounted for nearly one-third of U.S.
asylum claims 14 and comprised 38% of all asylum cases granted
by U.S. immigration courts in 2010.15 No other country even6
comes close to China in the number of asylum cases granted.'
Given China's salient position in our asylum system, the issue of
whether involuntary insertion of IUDs constitutes persecution
must be addressed in a principled way by adjudicators.
Moreover, the countries of origin with the highest number
of asylum cases granted by U.S. immigration courts include
several places where FGM is widespread, such as Ethiopia,
Egypt, Somalia, Guinea, and Eritrea. 17 According to the World
Health Organization (WHO), the prevalence of FGM among
women ages 15-49 is seventy-four percent in Ethiopia, ninetyone percent in Egypt, ninety-eight percent in Somalia, ninety-six

13 U.N. HIGH COMM'N FOR REFUGEES [UNHCR], ASYLUM LEVELS AND

TRENDS IN INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES 2010 7 (2011), available at http://
www.unhcr.org/4d8c5bl09.html (stating that, for the fifth year in a row, the
United States has the largest number of asylum claims among the forty-four
industrial countries included in the report).
14

1d. at7.

15 EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FY

2010 STATISTICAL Y.B. JI (2011) [hereinafter EOIR 2010 YB] available at http:/
www.justice.gov/eoir/statspub/fylOsyb.pdf [hereinafter EOIR 2010] (stating that
immigration courts granted 3795 Chinese asylum cases in 2010).
161d.

17 In 2010, Ethiopia ranked second, accounting for 4.12% of the total
number of asylum cases granted by U.S. immigration courts; Egypt ranked sixth,
accounting for 2.19%, with 216 cases granted; Somalia ranked seventh,
accounting for 2.11% with 208 cases granted; Guinea ranked tenth, accounting
for 1.88%, with 186 cases granted; and Eritrea ranked twelfth (percentage not
given). Id.
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percent in Guinea, and eighty-nine percent in Eritrea. 18 FGM is
also common in certain parts of Cameroon, which likewise ranks
among the top dozen countries in the number of asylum cases
granted. 19
Since the United States does not collect data on asylum
cases based on the type of claim, it is unfortunately impossible
to determine how many of the asylum claims from these
countries involved FGM or other gender-related forms of harm.
Nor do we have adequate data regarding the number of asylum
claims made by females, the percentage granted, or how these
statistics compare to those for males. 20 Data is gathered by
different U.S. agencies in a haphazard and inconsistent way,
such that some information regarding 'the gender of applicants
appears in statistics on affirmative asylum decisions (i.e. those
made by the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service's Asylum

18 See WORLD HEALTH ORG., FEMALE GENITAL MUTILATION AND OTHER

HARMFUL PRACTICES: PREVALENCE OF FGM, available at http://www.who.intl

reproductivehealth/topics/fgm/prevalence/cn/indcx.html (last visited Sept. 7,
2011) (providing data on FGM compiled in 2005-2008).
19 EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, supra note 15, at. JI
(showing that Cameroon ranked number eleven, with 196 asylum cases granted,
accounting for 1.99% of the total number of the asylum grants); Agbor v.
Gonzales, 487 F.3d 499, 503 (7th Cir. 2007) (finding that the "most brutal" form
of FGM, infibulation, is still common in the Southern Province of Cameroon);
see also infra notes 120-21 below and accompanying text (discussing Agbor v.
Gonzales).

20The Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) fails to publish
asylum statistics based on gender in defensive cases (i.e. asylum claims made in
immigration court during removal proceedings). Only the total number of asylum
applications granted by immigration judges for individuals from these countries
is available. Thus, we know that in 2010, immigration courts granted 407 of the
614 applications received from Ethiopians (66%), 208 of the 445 applications
received from Somalis (47%), 216 of the 393 applications received from
Egyptians (55%), 186 of the 397 applications received from Guineans (47%),
and 179 of the 283 applications received from Eritreans (63%), but we do not
know how many of these applications were made by women or girls. EXEC.
OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, supra note 15, at 2-6.
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Offices)2 and refugee status determinations made abroad, 22 but
not in statistics on defensive asylum decisions (i.e. those made
by immigration judges during removal proceedings).
Collecting and analyzing data that is disaggregated by
gender, country of origin, and type of claims in a consistent way
is an important first step to better identify and assess emerging

21 The Department of Homeland Security (DHS), which tracks decisions
in affirmative asylum cases, provides statistics showing that forty-five percent of
the principal applicants granted affirmative asylum in 2009 were female (3982
females out of 8931 applicants granted asylum). DHS fails, however, to provide
disaggregatcd data regarding the number of asylum applications received by
gender, thereby making it impossible to determine what percent of asylum
applications filed by females were granted, or to compare that number to the
percent granted for males. OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATS., U.S. DEP'T OF
HOMELAND SECURITY, 2009 Y.B. OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 46 (2009),

available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/yearbook/2009/
oisjyb_2009.pdf.
22 DHS's data shows that only thirty-three percent of the principal
applicants admitted to the United States as refugees in 2009 were female, which
is much smaller than the forty-five percent figure for females who arc
affirmatively granted asylum after arriving in the United States. Id. at 42. Of the
32,511 principal applicants admitted as refugees in 2009, only 10,672 were
female. Id. This statistic may seem surprising in light of the UNHCR's
observation that the percentage of females among asylum-seekers is usually
"significantly lower" than the percentage of females among refugees. U.N. HIGH
COMM'N FOR REFUGEES, 2005 GLOBAL REFUGEE TRENDS 30 (2006), available at
http://www.unhcr.org/4486ccbl2.pdf. Part of the explanation may be that
UNHCR considers female principal applicants, as well as female dependents
(spouses and children) in its calculation of the total number of refugees. If we
include female dependents among those admitted to the United States as
refugees, the percentage of females increases to about forty-eight percent, which
comes quite close to the total percentage of females (counting principals and
dependents) granted asylum in the U.S., around forty-six percent. OFFICE OF
STATS., U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, 2009 Y.B. OF
IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 42, 46 (2009). Among the 74,602 refugees admitted to
IMMIGRATION

the United States in 2009, 10,672 were female principal applicants, 11,596 were
the female spouses of male principal applicants (compared to only 1844 male
spouses of female principal applicants), and 13,843 were the female children of
principal applicants (compared to 14,808 male children). Id. at 42
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trends in the analysis of gender-related persecution. 23 Simply
focusing on grant rates for women is not enough, as high grant
rates do not necessarily indicate the absence of discrimination in
the process: based on the severity of harm that women are
fleeing, "[i]t may . . . be the case that they should receive a
disproportionately higher rate of success in the asylum process
and that even an equal or slightly higher rate reflects
discrimination in outcomes.'2 4 The specter of such
discrimination looms large in the United States given the
absence of a principled framework for understanding the concept
of persecution.
I.

The Absence of a Principled Framework for
Understanding the Concept of Persecution under U.S.
Asylum Law

Congress did not define persecution in the Immigration and
Nationality Act. Neither the 1951 Refugee Convention nor the
1967 Protocol defines this term. Rather, our understanding of the
term has evolved through case law. In general, persecution is
understood as an "extreme concept, marked by the infliction of

23 Among other problems, aggregated data regarding the number of
women who apply for or receive asylum may mask huge disparities based on
country of origin. For example, one UK study showed that women made only
fourteen percent of asylum claims from Iran and Sudan, but over fifty-six percent
of claims from Eritrea. REFUGEE WOMEN'S RES. PROJECT, WOMEN ASYLUM
SEEKERS IN THE UK-A GENDER PERSPECTIVE: SOME FACTS AND FIGURES 35

(2003), available at http://www.asylumaid.org.uk/data/files/publications/29/
Women%20asylum%20scckers%2Oi n%20the%20U K%20a%20gcnder
%20perspective.pdf.
24

HEAVEN CRAWLEY &

TRINE LESTER,

U.N.

HIGH

COMM'N FOR

REFUGEES COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF GENDER-RELATED PERSECUTION IN
59, 61 (2004),
NATIONAL ASYLUM LEGISLATION AND PRACTICE IN EUROPE I

available at http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/homc/
opcfidocPDFViewer.html?docid=40cO71354. According to Crawley and Lester's
analysis, one-third of women's asylum claims in the UK resulted in some status
being granted after appeal, compared with a national average of only nineteen
percent in 2001. Id. 69. However, only about twenty-four percent of the 71,030
asylum applications made in the United Kingdom that year were made by
women. Id. 5 1. Thus, women in the United Kingdom appear to be granted
asylum at a significantly higher rate than men but apply in much lower numbers.
These statistics may suggest that only women facing the most severe and/or
prevalent forms of harm tend to apply for asylum
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suffering or harm ... in a manner regarded as offensive 25 or for
26
reasons "that this country does not recognize as legitimate.
Persecution requires more than mere harassment or
discrimination, and it need not amount to torture or lifethreatening violence. 27 Within these outer bounds, however, little
guidance exists to help adjudicators analyze when harm or
suffering amounts to persecution.
As courts have noted, persecution is a "very factdependent" determination, 28 and "the difference between
harassment and persecution is necessarily one of degree . . .
[such that] the degree must be assessed with regard to the
context in which the mistreatment occurs." 29 Thus, the
interpretation of persecution in the United States leaves much to
25Li v. Ashcroft, 356 F.3d 1153, 1158 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (quoting
Fisher v. I.N.S., 79 F.3d 955, 961 (9th Cir. 1996) (en bane)); see also lvanishvili
v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 433 F.3d 332, 341 (2d Cir. 2006) (defining persecution
as "the' infliction of suffering or harm upon those who differ on the basis of a
protected statutory ground"); Tulenqky v. Gonzales, 425 F.3d 1277, 1280 (10th
Cir. 2005) (defining persecution as "the infliction of suffering or harm upon
those who differ in a way regarded as offensive," and as "requirce[ing] more than
just restrictions or threats to life and liberty" (quoting Chaib v. Ashcroft, 397 F.
3d 1273, 1277 (10th Cir. 2005)); Zhao v. Gonzales, 404 F.3d 295, 307 (5th Cir.
2005) (defining persecution as "[t]he infliction of suffering or harm, under
government sanction, upon persons who differ in a way regarded as offensive ...
in a manner condemned by civilized governments" (quoting Abdel-Masich v.
INS, 73 F.3d 579, 583-84 (5th Cir. 1996)); Khalili v. Holder, 557 F.3d 429, 436
(6th Cir. 2009) (defining persecution as "the infliction of harm.. to overcome a
characteristic of the victim" (quoting Pilica v. Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 941, 950 (6th
Cir. 2004)); Sepulveda v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 401 F.3d 1226, 1231 (11 th Cir. 2005)
("Persecution is an extreme concept, requiring more than a few isolated incidents
of verbal harassment or intimidation ... [m]crc harassment does not amount to
persecution." (quoting Gonzalez v. Reno, 212 F.3d 1338, 1335 (11 th Cir. 2000)).
But see Li v. Gonzales, 405 F.3d 171, 177 (4th Cir. 2005) (limiting persecution to
"the infliction of threat of death, torture, or injury to one's person or freedom").
26Begzatowski v. I.N.S., 278 F.3d 665, 668 (7th Cir. 2002).
27See, e.g., Chen v. I.N.S., 359 F.3d 121, 128 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding that
persecution means conduct that rises above "mere harassment" but can include
physical abuse short of life threatening violence); Begzatowski, 278 F.3d at 669.
28Cordon-Garcia v. I.N.S., 204 F.3d 985, 991 (9th Cir. 2000).
29 Beskovic v. Gonzales, 467 F.3d 223, 226 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
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the subjective assessments of judges, rather than referring to an
objective, principled framework. Indeed, as the Seventh and
Third Circuits have explicitly recognized, defining persecution
"is a most elusive and imprecise task, one that is at the margins
perhaps uniquely political in nature." 30 Michelle Foster notes
that "[t]he risk of subjectivity is particularly acute in cases
involving gender-related persecution, where decision-makers in
many jurisdictions have shown a greater propensity to dismiss
claims based on the view that discrimination1l against women is
justified by culture, religion or social norms.'
Consequently, different courts have applied the concept of
persecution quite differently, even in the context of physical
harm. At one end of the spectrum, the Ninth Circuit consistently
treats physical harm as persecution 32 and generally finds that
detention and confinement constitute persecution. 33 The Ninth
Circuit has also found that a forced pregnancy exam constitutes
persecution. 34 Other circuits, however, have embraced a
narrower view of persecution. In one case, for example, the
Tenth Circuit found no past persecution where an IndonesianChristian suffered repeated "beatings and robberies at the hands

30Janusiak v. I.N.S.,
947 F.2d 46, 48 n.I(3d Cit. 1991) (quoting Balazoski
v. I.N.S., 932 F.3d 638, 642 (7th Cir. 1991).
31

MICHELLE FOSTER,

INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE

LAW AND SOCIO-

ECONOMIC RIGHTS 38-39 (2007).
32 See, e.g., Chand v. I.N.S., 222 F.3d 1066, 1073-74 (9th Cir. 2000); Li v.
Holder, 559 F.3d 1096, 1107 (9th Cit. 2009); Ahmed v. Kcisler, 504 F.3d 1183,
1194 (9th Cir. 2007).

33See Ndom v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 743, 752 (9th Cit. 2004) (finding that a
Senegalese applicant who was threatened and detained twice under harsh
conditions for a total of twenty-five days had established persecution),
superseded by statute, Real ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, div. B, 119 Stat.
231, as recognized in Parussimova v. Mukasey, 555 F.3d 734, 739-40 (9th Cit.
2009); see also Kalubi v. Ashcroft, 364 F.3d 1134, 1136 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding
that imprisonment in an overcrowded Congolese jail cell with harsh, unsanitary
and life-threatening conditions established past persecution).

34See Li v. Ashcroft, 356 F.3d 1153, 1158 & 1158 n.4 (9th Cit. 2004) (en
banc) (finding that a "crude" and "physically invasive" exam performed without
the petitioner's consent established past persecution even though it did not
necessarily involve physical injury or result in any permanent health effects).
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of Muslims. '35 This case contrasts sharply with a decision of the
Ninth Circuit finding past persecution based on similar, if not
less severe, harm, where an Indo-Fijian was robbed multiple
times, compelled to quit his job, and had his family home
looted. 36 Moreover, the Seventh Circuit found no past
persecution in the case of a Chinese petitioner even where
family planning officials ordered his pregnant girlfriend to
appear at a hospital for a forced abortion, "kicked and struck
[him] with fists in an attempt to bring him to the police station,
[hit him] on the head with a brick [causing an injury that
required seven stitches,
and] asked him to turn himself in after
37
seeking treatment.
At lower levels of decision-making, even more extreme
examples abound. For example, in one case arising in the
Seventh Circuit, the immigration judge found no past
persecution where a violent group called the Mungiki,
comprised of Kikuyus, the largest ethnic group in Kenya, broke
into the petitioner's home, killed his servant, tried to
"circumcise" his wife, killed the family pets, burned two
vehicles, threatened to gouge out the petitioner's eyes,
threatened to kill him, and then "kidnapped and tortured him,
releasing him only after he promised to produce his wife for
circumcision. '38 On review, Judge Posner dismissed the
immigration
judge's finding of no past persecution as
"absurd,"3 9 but the case underscores how the absence of a
definitive framework for analyzing persecution leaves much to
adjudicators' discretion and can lead to shocking results.
When it comes to nonphysical forms of harm, the absence
of a clear legal framework for determining what actions
constitute persecution is even more striking. For example, while
the Ninth Circuit and several other circuits have found that
35Sidabutar v. Gonzalcs, 503 F.3d I 116, 1118, 1124 (1Oth Cir. 2007).
36See Surita v. INS, 95 F.3d 814, 819-21 (9th Cir. 1996).
37Zhu v. Gonzalcs, 465 F.3d 316, 318 (7th Cir. 2006).
38Gatimi v. Holdcr, 578 F.3d 611, 614 (7th Cir. 2009).
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"[p]ersecution may be psychological or emotional, as well as
physical," 40 the Fourth Circuit has taken the position that
"'persecution' cannot be based on fear of psychological harm
alone." 41 With respect to economic harm, the Ninth Circuit has
found that persecution may encompass "a deliberate imposition
of substantial economic disadvantage," 2 and the Seventh Circuit
has found that confiscation of property "might cross the line
from harassment to persecution," 43 whereas the Eighth and Third
Circuits generally require "a showing that allegations of
economic hardship threaten the petitioners life or freedom in

41 Mashiri v. Ashcrofl, 383 F.3d 1112, 1120 (9th Cir. 2004) (discussing
emotional trauma suffered by an ethnic Afghan family based on anti-foreigner
violence in Germany); see also Makhoul v. Ashcroft, 387 F.3d 75, 80 (Ist Cit.
2004) ("[U]nder the right set of circumstances, a finding of past persecution
might rest on a showing of psychological harm."); Boykov v. I.N.S.,
109 F.3d
413, 416 (7th Cir. 1997) (expressing willingness, in rare cases, to regard mere
threats as persecution); Li Wu Lin v. I.N.S.,
238 F.3d 239, 244 (3d Cir. 2001)
(finding that persecution can include "threats to life" (quoting Chang v. I.N.S.,
119 F.3d 1055, 1059 (3d Cir. 1997))); Chen v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 221, 225 (3d
Cir. 2004) ("[T]he persecution of one spouse by means of a forced abortion or
sterilization causes the other spouse to experience intense sympathetic suffering
that rises to the level of persecution."); Jorgc-Tzoc v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d 146,
160 (2d Cir. 2006) (remanding for the agency to evaluate whether the applicant,
of Mayan descent, experienced past persecution where, as a small child, he
survived a massacre against Mayans, saw the soldiers who murdered his sister,
her family, as well as other relatives, observed his cousin's bullet-riddled body
on the ground and lost his land and property when the massacre forced his family
to relocate).
41Niang v. Gonzales, 492 F.3d 505, 512 (4th Cir. 2007) (finding that the
petitioner's claim for withholding of removal failed as a matter of law because it
was based solely on the psychological harm she would suffer if her daughter
accompanied her to Senegal and was subjected to FGM).
42Kovac v. I.N.S.,
407 F.2d 102, 107 (9th Cir. 1969); see also Baballah v.
Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 1067, 1076 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding that severe harassment,
threats, violence and discrimination made it virtually impossible for an Israeli
Arab to cam a living). The Ninth Circuit has stressed that absolute inability is not
required for economic harm to constitute persecution. Baballah, 367 F.3d at
1076.
43Mitev v. I.N.S., 67 F.3d

1325, 1330 (7th Cir. 1995).
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order to rise to the level of persecution." 44 Noting that the BIA
had also applied various standards for determining when
economic harm rises to the level of persecution, the Second
v. Gonzales for the BIA
Circuit remanded the case of Mirzoyan
45
to clarify the correct standard.
In 2007, the BIA issued its decision in i re T-Z-, which
held that economic harm should be evaluated under the general
standard for nonphysical harm mentioned in a much older BIA
case, 46 which referenced a standard "outlined in a 1978 House
Report. '47 This standard provides that "[t]he harm or suffering
need not be physical, but may take other forms, such as the
deliberate imposition of severe economic disadvantage or the
deprivation of liberty, food, housing, employment or other
essentials of life." 48 While the BIA went on to explain how to
apply this standard in cases involving economic harm, it did not
provide any guidance regarding other forms of nonphysical
harm, such as psychological harm.
Since adjudicators are often uncertain about how to handle
nonphysical forms of harm, especially psychological harm,
which is uniquely difficult to analyze objectively, the tendency is
simply to ignore such harm in determining whether the applicant
44 Makatengkcng v. Gonzales, 495 F.3d 876, 883 (8th Cir. 2007)
(emphasis added) (considering the case of an Indonesian who could not find
238 F.3d 239, 244
employment because of his albinism); accord Lin v. I.N.S.,
(3d Cir. 2001) ("Persecution can include ... economic restrictions so severe that
119 F.
they constitute a real threat to life and freedom." (quoting Chang v. I.N.S.,
3d 1055, 1059 (3d Cir. 1997))); see also In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 222
(BIA 1985), abrogated by I.N.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987).
45

Mirzoyan v. Gonzales, 457 F.3d 217, 219-20 (2d Cir. 2006) (considering

whether someone who was denied admission to a prestigious college, could not
find a job in her profession, and was discharged from her job as an unskilled
worker on account of her ethnicity had been subjected to persecution).
46 fi

re T-Z-, 24 1.& N. Dec. 163, 170 (BIA 2007) (citing In re

Laipenieks, 18 1.& N. Dec. 433, 457 (BIA 1983), rev'don other grounds, 750 F.

2d 1427 (9th Cir. 1985)).
47In re T-Z- at
48

171.

H.R. Rep. No. 95-1452, at 5 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.

4700,4704.
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experienced past persecution. These omissions are especially
likely to occur if there are no precedents on point regarding the
specific harm at issue. For instance, in Ngengwe v. Mukasey,
which involved the "open issue" of "whether forced marriage
constitutes persecution," 49 the Eighth Circuit found that the
immigration judge had "offered no analysis, and cited no law, on
why the choice between forced marriage, death, or paying an
50
unaffordable bride's price does not constitute persecution."
Moreover, the immigration judge failed to consider the
cumulative significance of the harmful events and entirely failed
to consider certain events, including Ngengwe's assertion that
"her in-laws confiscated all of her property and threatened to
take her children." 51 The BIA had also completely failed to
consider "the non-physical actions of Ngengwe's in-laws."5 2 The
court, therefore, remanded the case so that the immigration
judge could address in the first instance whether the cumulative
harms, including non-physical harms, rose to the level of
persecution.5 3 On remand, the BIA's decision in T-Z- is unlikely
to provide much assistance regarding the in-laws' threats to take
away Ngengwe's children since, as noted above, that decision
did nothing to clarify the standard for determining when
psychological harm rises to the level of persecution.
The absence of a principled framework for analyzing both
physical and nonphysical harm in U.S. asylum law has led to a
creeping standard regarding the degree of harm necessary to
establish persecution in cases involving interference with
women's sexual and reproductive functions. Part 11 analyzes this
rising bar for persecution with respect to two practices: female
genital mutilation and involuntary insertion of an IUD.

49Ngengwe v. Mukasey, 543 F.3d 1029, 1036 (8th Cir. 2008).
50Id. at 1036-37 (citing Goa v. Gonzales, 440 F.3d 62, 70 (2d Cir. 2006)
(calling "lifelong, involuntary marriage" persecution), vacated on procedural
grounds by Kcisler v. Gao, 552 U.S. 801 (2007)).

5 d.
52Id.
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I1. The Rising Bar for Persecution in Cases Involving
Sexual and Reproductive Harm
A.

Female Genital Mutilation

Female genital mutilation (FGM) "comprises all
procedures involving partial or total removal of the external
female genitalia, or other injury to the female genital organs,
carried out for traditional, cultural or religious reasons.1 54 As
noted above, 100 to 140 million girls and women worldwide are
subjected to FGM. 55 The World Health Organization (WHO) has
classified FGM into three basic types: Type I, called
clitoridectomy, involves partial or total removal of the clitoris;
Type II, called excision, involves removal of the clitoris plus
part or all of the labia minora; Type III, called infibulation,
involves removal of the labia minora with the labia majora sewn
together, covering the urethra and vagina. 56 Types I and Il are the
most common forms of the practice worldwide, although Type
III dominates in certain countries.5 7 The issue currently
emerging in the case law is whether Type I FGM, clitoridectomy,
constitutes persecution.
Until recently, there appeared to be a strong consensus
among the BIA and the circuit courts that the harm associated
with female genital mutilation rose to the level of persecution.
Since the BIA issued its 1996 seminal decision in In re Kasinga,
finding that FGM can constitute persecution, 8 numerous circuit

54 U.N. HIGH COMM'N ON REFUGEES, GUIDANCE

CLAIMs RELATING TO FEMALE GENITAL MUTILATION,

http://www.unhcr.org/rcfworld/docid/4a0c28492.html

NOTE ON REFUGEE

2 (2009), available at
[hereinafter U.N. HIGH

COMM'N ON REFUGEES: GUIDANCE ON FGM].
55WHO: Female GenitalMutilation, supra note 5.
56 WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, FACT SHEET No. 241 (2010), available

at http://www.who.int/mediaccntre/factshects/fs24 I/en/index.html; see also U.N.
HIGH COMM'N ON REFUGEES: GUIDANCE ON FGM, supra note 54.

57See UNFPA, supra note 8.
58In re Kasinga, 21 1. & N. Dec. 357, 365 (BIA 1996) (en banc).
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courts have reached the same conclusion. 59 While these cases
note that different types of FGM exist in various countries, the
courts did not distinguish between these different types in
finding that FGM constitutes persecution.
Recent decisions, however, indicate some disagreement
among the circuit courts, as well as between some circuits and
the BIA, as to whether all forms of FGM amount to persecution.
The Ninth, Eighth, and Fourth Circuits have clearly held that all
forms of FGM constitute persecution. 60 While the Second and
Sixth Circuits have not explicitly addressed this issue, their
decisions on FGM suggest that they would likely reach the same
conclusion. 61 The First and Tenth Circuits, on the other hand,
have used language indicating that they may not consider all
forms of FGM to constitute persecution. 62
Moreover, the Ninth Circuit's recent decision in Benyamin
v. Holder, reviewing an unpublished decision of the BIA,
revealed that the BIA had found no past persecution in a case

59See, e.g., Mohammed v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 785, 795 (9th Cir. 2005)
("[T]he range of procedures collectively known as female genital mutilation rises
to the level of persecution within the meaning of our asylum law."); Barry v.
Gonzales, 445 F.3d 741, 745 (4th Cir. 2006) ("FGM constitutes persecution
within the meaning of the Immigration and Nationality Act.
...
); Niang v.
Gonzales, 422 F.3d 1187, 1197 (1Oth Cir. 2005) (holding that "FGM constitutes
persecution"); Abay v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 634, 638 (6th Cir. 2004) ("Forced
female genital mutilation involves the infliction of grave harm constituting
persecution ....");Balogun v. Ashcroft, 374 F.3d 492, 499 (7th Cir. 2004)
("[T]he Agency does not dispute, at least with any force, that the type of FGM
which Ms. Balogun has alleged is 'persecution'."); Hassan v. Gonzales, 484 F.3d
513, 517 (8th Cir. 2007) ("[W]e now join the growing number of our sister
circuits that have considered this issue and concluded that there is 'no doubt that
the range of procedures collectively known as female genital mutilation rises to
the level of persecution'.
) (citing Mohammed v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 785,
795 (9th Cir.2005)).
I See Benyamin v. Holder, 579 F.3d 970, 975 (9th Cir. 2009); Hassan v.
Gonzales, 484 F.3d 513, 517 (8th Cir. 2007); Kourouma v. Holder, 588 F.3d 234,
244 (4th Cir. 2009).
61 See, e.g., Abankwah v. I.N.S.,
185 F.3d 18, .23(2d Cir. 1999); Abay v.
Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 634, 638 (6th Cir. 2002).
61 See, e.g., Toure v. Ashcroft, 400 F.3d 44, 49 (1st Cir. 2005); Niang v.
Gonzales, 422 F.3d 1187, 1193 (10th Cir. 2005).
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involving Type I FGM (clitoridectomy). Given that all of the
BIA's published cases on FGM involve more extreme forms of
FGM and that the BIA emphasizes the atrocious nature of the
harm in those cases, it remains unclear how the BIA will treat
cases of Type I FGM arising outside of the circuits that have
explicitly addressed this issue.63 In addition, the BIA and circuit
court decisions reveal that immigration judges are not
consistently treating FGM, in all its forns, as persecution. After
discussing these various decisions, this Article argues that the
BIA is applying a higher standard for persecution in cases
involving FGM. As in cases involving involuntary insertion of
an IUD, it appears that the BIA is demanding a greater degree of

63 If a circuit court decision conflicts with a BIA precedent, the BIA will
apply the ruling of the circuit court only in cases arising in that circuit, and will
apply its own precedent in cases arising in circuits that have not yet addressed
the issue or that have taken a position consistent with that of the BIA.
Consequently, if various circuits have different legal positions on a particular
issue, the BIA applies conflicting legal rules based on the location of the court
that initially decided the case.
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physical harm than generally required and failing to give proper
weight to the nonphysical forms of harm associated with FGM.64
1. The BIA's Ambiguous Position On Whether All
Forms of FGM Constitute Persecution
In its 1996 groundbreaking decision, In re Kasinga, the
BIA held that "FGM, as practiced by the Tchamba-Kusuntu

64 Numerous studies document the psychological harm associated with
FGM. For example, a survey of 264 Egyptian women in Benha City found that
"circumcised" women experienced "somatization, anxiety, and phobia" at higher
rates than non-circumcised women and had a higher rate of PTSD and memory
problems. See A. Elnashar & R. Abdelhady, The Impact of Female Genital
Cutting on Health of Newly Married Women, 97 INT'L J. GYNECOLOGY &
OBSTETRICS 238, 243 (2007). The study further found:

Psychological complications may be submerged deep in
the child's subconscious and may trigger behavior
disturbances. Women may suffer incompleteness, anxiety,
depression, chronic irritability, and frigidity. Many girls
and women, traumatized by their experience but with no
acceptable means of expressing their fears, suffer in
silence.
Id. Other studies corroborate such findings. See, e.g., Alice Behrendt & Steffen
Moritz, Posttraumatic Stress Disorder and Memory Problems After Female
Genital Mutilation, 162 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1000, 1001 (2005) (finding that, of
forty-seven Senegalese women surveyed who had experienced FGM, "over 90%
of the women described feelings of intense fear, helplessness, horror and severe
pain," "over 80% were still suffering intrusive re-experiences of their
circumcision," and over thirty percent had post-traumatic stress disorder, which
is similar to the rate of this disorder among victims of childhood abuse); James
Whitehorn, Oyedeji Ayonrinde, & Samantha Maingay, Female Genital
Mutilation: Cultural and Psychological Implications, 17 SEXUAL &
RELATIONSHIP THERAPY 161, 162 (2002) (noting that the focus on the physical
harm associated with FGM often detracts from "the often neglected
psychological morbidity associated with the practice of FGM"); WORLD HEALTH
ORG.,

ELIMINATING

FEMALE

GENITAL MUTILATION:

AN INTERAGENCY

STATEMENT 34 (2008) (citing studies showing that FGM leads to "increased

likelihood of fear of sexual intercourse, post-traumatic stress disorder, anxiety,
depression, and memory loss"); see also Clara Thierfelder, Marcel Tanner &
Claudia M. Kessler Bodiang, Female Genital Mutilation in the Context of
Migration: Experience of African Women with the Swiss Health Care System, 15
EUR. J. PUB. HEALTH 86, 87-88 (2005) (examining "sexual difficulties" and
"reduced sensation during sexual intercourse" among women from various
countries where FGM is widespread, including Somalia, Ethiopia and Eritrca).
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Tribe of Togo and documented in the record, constitutes
persecution." 65 The BIA observed:
According to the applicant's testimony, the
FGM practiced by her tribe . . . is of an

extreme type involving cutting the genitalia
with knives, extensive bleeding, and a 40-day
recovery period.... The background materials
confirmed that the FGM practiced in some
African countries, such as Togo, is of an
extreme nature causing permanent damage,
and not just a minor form of genital ritual....
The record material establishes that FGM in its
extreme forms is a practice in which portions
of the female genitalia are cut away. In some
cases, the vagina is sutured partially closed.
This practice clearly inflicts harm or suffering
6
upon the girl or woman who undergoes it. 6
Noting that the parties disagreed about "the parameters of FGM
as a ground for asylum in future cases," the Board explicitly
stated, "we decline to speculate on, or establish rules for, cases
that are not before us." 67 Thus, the Board did not specifically

address whether all forms of FGM constitute persecution.
However, the Board did generally comment:
FGM is extremely painful and at least
temporarily incapacitating. It permanently
disfigures the female genitalia. FGM exposes
the girl or woman to the risk of serious,
potentially life-threatening complications.
These include, among others, bleeding,
infection, urine retention, stress, shock,
psychological trauma, and damage to the
urethra and anus. It can result in permanent

65

In re Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 358 (BIA 1996) (en banc)

(emphasis added).
66

Id.
at 36 1.

67

Id. at 358.
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adversely
loss of genital sensation and can
68
affect sexual and erotic functions.
These remarks did not distinguish between different types of
FGM, thereby leaving open the possibility-and even suggesting
-that less severe forms of FGM also constitute persecution.
Subsequent decisions, however, suggest that the BIA's position
may be more limited.
In a 2007 decision, In re A-T-, the BIA considered the case
of a woman from Mali who had been subjected to Type II FGM
(excision), involving removal of her clitoris and vulva. 69 The
immigration judge had found that the woman did not experience
past persecution because the FGM was inflicted when she was a
young girl and she did "not even recall" the experience. 70 On
appeal, the BIA did not directly address the issue of past
persecution, but assumed arguendo that even if the applicant had
demonstrated past persecution on account of her membership in
a particular social group, she would nevertheless be ineligible

68 Id. at

361.

69 In re A-T-, 24 I. & N. Dcc. 296 (BIA 2007), vacated and remanded by
Matter of A-T-, 24 1. & N. Dec. 617 (BIA 2008); Carrie Acus Love, Note,
UnrepeatableHarms: Female GenitalMutilation and Invohntaty Sterilization in
U.S. Asylum Law, 40 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 173, 212 (2008) (discussing
the facts of A-T- that were included in the amicus brief submitted by thc
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists ct al.).

70 Matter of A-T-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 617 (BIA 2008).
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for withholding of removal based on her failure to show a wellfounded fear of future persecution. 71
In September 2008, the Attorney General vacated the BIA's
denial of withholding of removal in In re A-T-.72 On remand, the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) requested that the
applicant present evidence "as to why her past FGM rises to the
level of persecution, because she does not remember the event
and her application alone should not be enough to establish that
she views FGM as a persecutory action. '73 In denying the DHS's
request, the BIA noted that "[t]he deplorable and extremely
harmful nature of FGM has been long recognized by this Board
and the Federal courts. ' 74 Nevertheless, the Board then went on
to state:
In this case, the respondent presented
unchallenged evidence to establish that she
was subject to a severe form of FGM. It is
difficult to think of a situation, short of a
claimant asserting that she did not consider
FGM to be persecution, where the type of

7' The immigration judge (IJ) and BIA both focused on whether the
applicant was eligible for withholding of removal. They found her ineligible for
asylum since she did not apply within one year of entering the United States. For
the same reason, they found her ineligible for "humanitarian asylum," which
requires a showing of "severe past persecution." In reaching this conclusion, the
BIA rejected the Ninth Circuit's "continuing persecution theory." In re A-T-, 24
1.& N. Dec. at 299-301. While the BIA acknowledged that "FGM is similar to
forced sterilization in the sense that it is a harm that is normally performed only
once but has ongoing physical and emotional effects," it proceeded to find that
FGM fell into "the same category as most other past injuries that rise to the level
of persecution, including those that involve some lasting disability, such as the
loss of a limb." Id. at 300. As discussed below, this finding reflects a failure to
understand the myriad ways in which FGM's long-term effects differ from that
of a purely physical injury, including its impact on female sexuality, reproductive
function, autonomy, and social and cultural behavior.
72 Matter

ofA-T-, 25 1.& N. Dec. at 621.

73Matter ofA-T-, 25 1. & N. Dec. 4, 10 (BIA 2009).
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FGM suffered by the respondent, at any 5age,
would not rise to the level of persecution. 7
While this statement confirms that the Board considers severe
forms of FGM to be persecution, it simultaneously suggests that
other types of FGM may not rise to the level of persecution;
otherwise, the BIA could have used much broader language in
rejecting the government's request.
Another published decision, Matter of S-A-K- and H-A-H-,
likewise raises questions about how the BIA views the severity
of harm in FGM cases. S-A-K- and H-A-H- involved a mother
and daughter from Somalia, who, like Kasinga, have undergone
Type III FGM (infibulation). 76 They filed a timely application
for asylum, and one of the issues before the BIA was whether
they qualified for humanitarian asylum, which may be granted
based on a showing of severe past persecution, even if the
applicants do not demonstrate a well-founded fear of future
persecution. The BIA described the horrendous facts as follows:
The daughter in this case testified that she was
forcibly circumcised by women brought home
by her father when she was 9 years old, in a
procedure similar to that suffered by her
mother. The procedure was done without
anesthesia and, although she recovered after 2
weeks, she has continued to have difficulty
urinating and has been unable to menstruate.
The aggravated nature of the procedure
performed on the daughter is also apparent in
that, because her vaginal opening was sewn
shut with a thorn, the man she was given to in
marriage, who ultimately raped her, could not
penetrate her for sexual intercourse. He was
only able to rape her by cutting her open,
causing her to bleed for many days.

75Id.
76 See

Matter of S-A-K- & H-A-H-, 24 1.& N. Dec. 464, 465 (BIA 2008).
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The mother, who is the lead respondent,
likewise testified that she suffered great pain
following her forced circumcision, particularly
during child birth, and that she almost died
during the actual procedure because of
infection. During her earlier pregnancies, her
vaginal opening was sewn shut after being
opened to allow for sexual intercourse and
child birth. She was sewn shut approximately
five times, and two of her children died during
childbirth. Of her six daughters, the three
oldest have been circumcised, and she was
beaten for opposing the procedure. 77
Stressing that the past persecution had taken the form of female
genital mutilation with aggravatedcircumstances,the BIA found
severe past persecution justifying a grant of humanitarian
asylum. 78 The BIA emphasized that the applicants had suffered
"an atrocious form of persecution that results in continuing
physical harm and discomfort" and therefore should not be
expected to return to Somalia." 79
In basing its holding on a finding of FGM with aggravated
circumstances, the decision suggests that less extreme facts may
not constitute "severe" past persecution meriting a humanitarian
grant of asylum. In other words, the BIA's reasoning makes it
unclear whether Type III FGM alone-without the related rapes,
life-threatening infections, multiple reinfibulations, and
stillbirths-can constitute severe past persecution. If not, then
the BIA's decision also casts doubt on whether it would treat
Type I FGM, "mere" clitoridectomy, as persecution.
These published BIA decisions, read together with the
Ninth Circuit's opinion in Benyamin, where the BIA found no

77Id.
78 Id. at 464.

COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF GENDER AND LAW

past persecution in a case involving Type I FGM, 80 strongly
suggest that the BIA does not consider all forms of FGM to rise
to the level of persecution. The language used by certain circuit
courts amplifies any ambiguity by the BIA on this issue.
2.

Seeds of a Circuit Court Split on Whether All
Forms of FGM Constitute Persecution?

In March 2005, the Ninth Circuit issued its decision in
Mohammed v. Gonzales, which addressed the situation of a
young woman from Somalia whose medical report indicated that
she had "experienced Type I [FGM] in its complete form"81 by
"'having [her] clitoris cut off with scissors at a young age'. 82
The BIA's adjudication of her case had been "sloppy"8 3 and
"characterized by a series of errors." 4 The Ninth Circuit also
described one of the BIA's decisions as "incomplete" 85 and
"nonsensical, ' 86 noting that it gave no indication that the BIA
had even considered "the significant documentary evidence
demonstrating Mohammed's past genital mutilation. 897 In
reversing the BIA's decision, the Ninth Circuit expressed "no
doubt that the range of procedures collectively known as female
genital mutilation rises to the level of persecution within the
meaning of our asylum law."8 8 The court stressed the severity of

80 See Benyamin v. Holder, 579 F.3d 970, 972 (9th Cir. 2009); see also
discussion infra Part II.A.2; notes 90-104 and accompanying text infra.

81Mohammed v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 785, 795 n.12 (9th Cir. 2005).
82

Id. at 790.

83Id. at 792.
84

1d. at 791.

85Id. at 792.
86

Id.

87 Mohammed, 400
88

ld. at 795.

F.3d at 792.
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FGM by treating it as a "'permanent and continuing' act of
persecution." 89
More recently, in Benyamin v. Holder, the Ninth Circuit
reaffirmed that all forms of FGM constitute persecution. 9" There,
the Court specifically reviewed the BIA's finding that the "Type
I" FGM inflicted on the applicant's daughter, Annisa, when she
was a five-day-old infant did not amount to persecution. The
applicant's stepmother had "ordered Annisa's circumcision
without the couple's consent" while she was still in the hospital
after her birth. 9' As a result of that procedure, Annisa
"continually experienced pain . . . most notably when she
washe[d] her genitals. '92 "These complications were at their
worst when Annisa was four years old, but were still ongoing as
of the time of the hearing before the IJ. '9 3 The IJ had recognized
that the procedure performed on Annisa was "harm," but
distinguished it from the type of harm in Kasinga, observing that
"the physical harm of the operation appear[s] to be 94minimal" in
Indonesia, according to the State Department report.
On appeal, the BIA agreed that the procedure inflicted on
Annisa "did not rise to the level of persecution, as it was less
severe than the procedure described in Kasinga and 'FGM as
practiced in Indonesia involves minimal short-term pain,
suffering, and complications'.' 9 5 In reaching this conclusion,
"It]he BIA highlighted a particular section of Kasinga, in which
the Board stated that "[t]he FGM practiced by her tribe ... is of
an extreme type involving cutting the genitalia with knives,
extensive bleeding, and a 40 day recovery period,' and is of an
89

ld. at 800.

90 Benyamin

v. Holder, 579 F.3d 970 (9th Cir. 2009).

91Id. at 973.
92 ld.

93Id.
94Id. at 973, 975 (emphasis added).
95 Id.

at 975.
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'[e]xtreme- nature causing permanent damage, and not just a
minor form of genital ritual'."96.
In reviewing this determination, the court found that the
BIA's reasoning was "fundamentally flawed and contrary to
Ninth Circuit and BIA precedent."9 7 The court stressed that,
sitting en banc in Abebe v. Gonzales, it had considered it "wellsettled that FGM constitutes persecution sufficient to warrant a
grant of asylum. '98 The court also quoted its decision in
Mohammed v. Gonzales, which involved the least severe kind of
FGM, as noted above. 99 Accordingly, the court found that "the
BIA's attempt to parse the distinction between different forms of
female genital mutilation is not only a threat to the rights of
women in a civilized society, but also runs counter to our circuit
precedent."' o
The Ninth Circuit went on to observe that the IJ's
suggestion that "there is no persecution because of minimal
physical harm ignores both the involuntary nature of the
procedure and the very real follow-on consequences,"
specifically noting the severe physical complications that can
result from even the "least drastic form" of FGM.10 l The court
confirmed that it would "not tolerate such line-drawing when it
comes to this practice, which the Department of State deems as
'threaten[ing] the health and violat[ing] the human rights of
women'."10 2 Using equally strong language, the court
underscored how the BLA's "attempt to distinguish Kasinga

96

97

Benyamin, 579 F.3d at 975.
1d.

98Id. at 974 (quoting Abebe v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 1037, 1042 (9th Cir.
2005) (en banc)).
99Id. at 976.
100Id.
101Id.
102Benyamin, 579 F.3d at 976.
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belie[d] what Kasinga actually stands for." 10 3 The court pointed
out that Kasinga "does not create a floor for the requisite level of
physical invasion necessary to render female genital mutilation
persecution under the law," and that "[a]ny suggestion otherwise
is a betrayal of the central holding of Kasinga."104
In Hassan v. Gonzales, the Eighth Circuit agreed with the
Ninth Circuit that "there is 'no doubt that the range of
procedures collectively known as female genital mutilation rises
to the level of persecution within the meaning of our asylum
law'.' 10 5 Moreover, in Kourouma v. Holder, the Fourth Circuit
stressed that all forms of FGM constitute persecution. 0 6 There,
the court considered the case of a woman from Guinea who had
been denied asylum by the IJand BIA based on an adverse
credibility determination, despite corroboriating evidence
establishing that she had been subjected to FGM. Although the
evidence in the record did not clearly indicate which type of
FGM the petitioner had suffered, 107 the court apparently did not
consider such evidence necessary, reasoning:
It is clear under our past precedent that any of
the methods used to conduct female genital
mutilation, including clitoridectomy, excision
or infibulations, would satisfy the
requirementsfor past persecution . . . .This
Circuit has found that female genital
mutilation constitutes past persecution, not
because of any particular method of
103

d at 976.

104
Id. at 977.
105 Hassan v. Gonzales, 484 F.3d 513, 517 (8th Cir. 2007) (quoting
Mohammed, 400 F.3d at 795). In Hassan, the petitioner had been subjected to
Type IIIFGM, which the court described as "by far the most invasive and
painful form of the procedure." Id. at n.1.

1O6Kourouma v. Holder, 588 F.3d 234, 245 (4th Cir. 2009).
107The evidence included two doctor's letters, one of which indicated that
Kourouma's gynecological exam revealed "'scattered linear scarring
approximately 0.5-1 cm on upper extremity'," and the second of which
succinctly verified that Kourouma "had been circumcised." Id. at 238.

COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF GENDER AND LAW

conducting it, but rather because of the serious
mental and physical harm it inflicts on the
Thus, if Kourouma
women who endure it....
can demonstrate that she was subject to female
genital mutilation in any form, she has met her
burden to prove past persecution. 108
Reversing the adverse credibility finding, the court found that
Kourouma had suffered past persecution.' 09
Thus, the Ninth, Eighth, and Fourth Circuits have clearly
held that all forms of FGM constitute persecution. While other
circuits have not yet addressed this issue head-on, the Second
and Sixth Circuits have both used language indicating that they
would treat all forms of FGM as persecution. In Abankwah v.
INS, the Second Circuit noted that "FGM is the collective name
given to a series of surgical operations, involving the removal of
some or all of the external genitalia, ' 'It quoted at length from
Kasinga regarding the physical and psychological consequences
of FGM, and stressed that "[t]he practice of FGM has been
internationally recognized as a violation of women's and female
children's rights," as well as "criminalized under federal law."' I I
Similarly, in Abay v. Ashcroft, the Sixth Circuit recognized that
"[florced female genital mutilation involves the infliction of
grave harm constituting persecution," quoting the same language
from Kasinga and making-the same observations about FGM as
the court in Abankwah. 112 Judge Sutton's concurrence in Abay,
however, seems to question whether all forms of FGM constitute
persecution, as it specifically notes that "the types of FGM
108ld. at 244.
109

Id. at 245.

10 Abankwah v. I.N.S., 185 F.3d 18 (2d Cir. 1999).
Id. at 23. In Abankwah, it was "not disputed" that 'FGM involves the
infliction of grave harm constituting persecution." Id.; see also Bah v. Mukascy,
529 F.3d 99, 112, n.1 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting the same language from Kasinga
and noting that the government did not dispute that the Type IIl form of FGM
experienced by the petitioner, which the court described as "by far the worst
kind," could constitute persecution).
112Abay

v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 634, 638 (6th Cir. 2002).
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practiced in Ethiopia are neither uniform in nature nor uniformly
debilitating to a woman's physical and psychological health."' 13
The decisions of the First and Tenth Circuits, on the other
hand, suggest that these courts may not consider all forms of
FGM to constitute persecution. In Toure v. Ashcroft, the First
Circuit noted that "FGM may constitute persecution under some
circumstances,"14 without any elaboration. In Niang v. Holder,
the Tenth Circuit quoted the BIA's underlying decision as
stating, "'we have not held that all instances of FGM will
constitute past persecution'.'115 In that case, the applicant's
description of the facts surrounding her FGM, involving a
physical attack by her family, was found not to be credible.
However, it was clear that she had experienced past FGM.
Indeed, a medical doctor, whose credibility was not questioned,
testified that the applicant's "'normal anatomy .. .had been
obliterated essentially to the extent that her ability to engage in
normal sexual intercourse was virtually impossible,' that she
would probably not be able to conceive children naturally, and
that she would not be able to deliver children vaginally."' 16
While the BIA acknowledged that the applicant had undergone
FGM and had "'scarring,"' it nevertheless declined to find that
all instances of FGM constitute past persecution and specifically
found no past persecution in this case due to the "incredible
testimony."' 17
Recognizing the flaw in the BIA's reasoning, the Tenth
Circuit vacated the finding of no past persecution, noting that
"Ms. Niang's claim of past persecution [did] not depend entirely
on her account of the attack by her family," that it was
"undisputed that she suffered FGM," and that "the injuries

113Id.

at, 644 (Sutton, J., concurring).

114
Toure v. Ashcroft, 400 F.3d 44, 49 (1stCir. 2005) (citing
21 1.& N. Dec. at 358) (emphasis added).

In re

Kasinga,

I's Niang v. Gonzales, 422 F.3d 1187, 1193 (10th Cir. 2005) (emphasis
added).
16 1d. at 1192.
7

1 Id. at 1193.
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described by Dr. Wilson-her scarring, inability to engage in
normal sexual relations, and inability to bear children naturally
-would certainly be sufficiently serious to qualify her FGM as
persecution."'1 8 The court therefore remanded the case for the
BIA to determine whether Ms. Niang suffered persecution in the
form of FGM as a result of the tribal membership, a critical issue
that the BIA had never addressed. 119 While the court's decision
to remand the case was proper, its discussion of past persecution,
which focuses on the "sufficiently serious" nature of the FGM
suffered by Ms. Niang, suggests that the court agreed with the
BIA's position that not all instances of FGM amount to
persecution; the court merely found that in this particular
situation involving extreme harm, the BIA had erred in finding
no past persecution.
The Seventh Circuit has yet to address this issue. In Agbor
v. Gonzales, where the Seventh Circuit vacated the BIA's finding
that a woman from Cameroon did not have a well-founded fear
of future persecution, there did not appear to be a dispute
regarding whether the type of FGM that she feared rose to the
level of persecution. 120 The court noted that in the Southern
Province, where the petitioner lived, "FGM is still common in its
most brutal form, infibulation."' 121 Likewise, in Balogun v.
Ashcroft, the BIA "[did] not dispute, at least with any force, that
the type of' 22FGM which Ms. Balogun [] alleged is
'persecution'.'
Thus, it remains to be seen how several of the
circuits will address cases involving Type I FGM. Their position
may well depend on the position of the BIA, which has not
Is Id. at 1201.

1191d.
120 Agbor v. Gonzales, 487 F.3d 499, 503 (7th Cir. 2007). The BIA gave
the following reasons for finding the petitioner's fear objectively unreasonable:
(I) FGM is not widely practiced in Cameroon; (2) FGM in Cameroon is usually
performed on pre-pubescent girls, not married adult women, and is mainly
practiced among Muslims; and (3) the government of Cameroon officially
opposes FGM. Id. The court rejected each of these reasons. Id. at 503-04.
121 Id.
122 Balogun v. Ashcroft, 374 F.3d 492, 499 (7th Cir. 2004). In Balogun, the
court did not describe the type of FGM that the petitioner had suffered.
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directly addressed whether Type I FGM constitutes persecution
in a published decision. As discussed above, however, the BIA's
published decisions on other types of FGM contain language
that casts doubt on whether it considers Type I FGM to be
persecution.
3.

Analysis of FGM Cases

The cases discussed above indicate that the BIA and some
circuit courts appear to require serious bodily injury for physical
harm to rise to the level of persecution when the harm at issue
involves women's sexual and reproductive functions. Instead of
comparing the harm in a given case to some objective standard
for persecution, the BIA is comparing it to the most extreme
form of the harm; thus, the BIA is erroneously comparing Type I
FGM to Type III FGM, just as it compares involuntary insertion
of an IUD to forced sterilization (discussed in Part II.B below),
which distorts the analysis of whether the harm is serious
enough to constitute persecution.
One explanation for this type of distortion is the heuristic
principle of "anchoring.' ' 23 Heuristics are cognitive shortcuts
that help us solve complex problems by reducing them to
simpler judgments. 124 Anchoring describes "the tendency of
judgments to be anchored in initially presented values."'1 25 When
an anchor leads to the systemic displacement of judgments
towards the anchor, this is known as an "assimilation effect,"
whereas the displacement of judgments away from the anchor is

23 Amos Tvcrsky & Daniel Kahneman, Introduction, in JUDGMENT
UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 14 (Daniel Kahneman, Paul

Slovic, & Amos Tvcrsky cds., 1982).
1241d. at 3.
125

Paul Slovic, Baruch Fischhoff, & Sarah Lichtenstein, Facts Versus

Fears: Understanding Perceived Risk, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY:
HEURISTICS AND BIASES 481 (Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic, & Amos Tvcrsky

cds., 1982).
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called a "contrast effect.' 26 Social psychological research has
shown that when the anchor is an extreme example of a
category, contrast effects emerge. 27 In fact, an extreme anchor
produces contrast effects regardless of whether the event to be
judged is ambiguous or unambiguous. 128 When an anchor is
moderate, on the other hand, assimilation tends to occur. 129 Thus,
the more extreme the anchor, the less likely it is that we will
judge another related event to fall within the same category.
A seminal precedent like Kasinga serves as an anchor for
assessing persecution in subsequent FGM cases, as it represents
the initial (and most salient) example of a particular category of
harm. Since Kasinga involved infibulation, an extreme form of
FGM, we can expect contrast effects, rather than assimilation
effects, to occur when judges assess other FGM cases involving
less extreme forms of the practice. In other words, there appears
to be a cognitive explanation for why various types of FGM may
not fall within the same category of harm in the minds of

126 Paul M. Herr, Steven J. Sherman, & Russell H. Fazio, On the
Consequences of Priming: Assimilation and Contrast Effects, 19 J.
EXPERIMENTAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 323, 325-26 (1983); see also Barry
Markovsky, Anchoring Justice, 51 SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 213 (1988) (noting that

studies have demonstrated contrast effects in a variety of contexts, including
"estimates of hue, brightness, loudness, esthetic and ethical values, intelligence,
tonal pitch, numbers of objects and severity of crimes").
127Herr, Sherman & Fazio, supra note 126, at 327, 335; cf Anders Kayc,
Schematic Psychology and Criminal Responsibility, 83 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 565,

585 (2009) ("[hlf the primed concept is 'extreme' ... the primed concept may
come to function as a 'standard of comparison' against which ambiguous stimuli
pale.") (citing GORDON B. MOSKOWITZ, SOCIAL COGNITION: UNDERSTANDING
SELF AND OTHERS 418-20 (2005)).
128Herr, Sherman & Fazio, supra note 126, at 335.

see also Jerry Suls & Ladd Wheeler, Psychological Magnetism: ,A
129Id.;
Brief History ofAssimilation and Contrast in Psychology, in ASSIMILATION AND

CONTRAST IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 28 (Diedcrik A. Stapel & Jerry Suls cds.,
2007) ("If people are primed with extreme exemplars (e.g. Hitler, Atilla the
Hun), contrast effects typically result, but with moderate exemplars as primes,
assimilation is more common.").
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judges. 130 Moreover, this cognitive bias may take place
automatically or implicitly, and need not be based on explicit,
consciously reasoned comparisons.' 31 Even judges who do not
intend to discriminate against women or minimize forms of
harm that they uniquely suffer experience automatic cognitive
biases that may skew their judgments, especially in the absence
more consciously connected to
of clear standards, to keep them
32
their analysis of persecution. 1
Cognitive bias may also help explain the BIA's failure to
give proper weight to nonphysical forms of harm. We tend to
overestimate the frequency of vivid events and underestimate the
frequency of events that are harder to visualize. 133 This effect is
130 Various scholars, both within and outside the legal field, have
discussed how contrast effects may influence legal decision-making. See, eg.,
Mark Kelman, Yuval Rottenstreich & Amos Tvcrsky, Context-Dependence in
Legal Decision Making, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 287,301 (1996) (discussing how "the
decisions of judges or juries may be prone to . . . contrast effects"); MARK
KELMAN, THE HEURISTICS DEBATE 29 (2011) (providing examples of how, in the
view of heuristics and bias researches, contrast effects can influence legal
outcomes). The influence of contrast effects on legal judgments is hardly
surprising given their direct impact on a wide variety of decisions. See Adam S.
Zimmerman, Funding Irrationality, 59 DUKE L.J. 1105, 1143 (2010) (noting

various areas where psychologists and behavioral economists

have found

contrast effects, including consumer good purchases, employment decisions,
elective medical procedures, and presidential elections).
131 Herr, Sherman & Fazio, supra note 126, at 338 ("this study has shown
that persons may automatically, without awareness, use recently activated
categories as standards"); see also Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind,
86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 784 (2001) ("Under certain circumstances judges rely
on heuristics that can lead to systematically erroneous judgments").

132 See Chris Guthrie et al., Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide
Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REV. I, 8-9 (2007) (discussing a "dual-process" model of
judging whereby "judges make intuitive judgments" that they "might (or might
not) override with deliberation")); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Does Unconscious
Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1195, 1222 (2009)
(showing, through a study involving one-hundred and thrity-three judges, that
implicit bias can influence decisionmaking but that such biases can also be
overcome). For an analysis of how implicit biases may influence decisionmaking specifically in the context of immigration court, see generally Fatma E.
Marouf, Implicit Bias and Innigration Courts, 45 NEw ENG. L. REV. 417
(2011).
133 HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT

98-99 (Thomas Gilovich, Dale W. Griffin & Daniel Kahneman eds., 2002).
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due to the availabilityheuristic, a cognitive shortcut whereby we
estimate the frequency of events based on how easily specific
examples come to mind.' 34 Vivid events are easier to recall, so
we assume they occur more frequently than events that are
difficult to imagine. Consequently, judges are likely to
underestimate the likelihood of abstract, nonphysical harm, such
as psychological harm and violations of autonomy and privacy,
which are difficult to visualize, especially when compared to the
vivid imagery of the physical mutilations involved in FGM. 135
In addition to having different degrees of vividness,
physical and nonphysical harm represent different informal
categories that we construct in our minds. For example, when
asked to evaluate the severity of harm suffered by a child whose
pajamas caught fire while he was playing with matches, subjects
will spontaneously compare the injury to other types of
household accidents, but "other harms, such as the destruction of
a reputation, or a drop in the population of dolphins, will not
come to mind when the case of the burned child is
considered.' 1 36 As Cass Sunstein and his colleagues explain,
"comparisons across categories of harms are particularly
difficult because they are not easily described in the same
language. . . .The difficulties of cross-category comparisons
inevitably lead to instability in the judgments of individuals, and
to an impairment of consensus, relative to within-category
comparisons."'1 37 While asylum adjudicators are supposed to
consider the cumulative harm that an applicant has experienced,
both physical and nonphysical, the difficulties involved in
finding language to describe both types of harm may contribute
to omitting discussion of nonphysical harm altogether.
134Id.

135 In one study, subjects provide higher estimates regarding their.
likelihood to contract a certain disease if the symptoms are concrete and easy to
imagine, such as muscle aches and headaches, than when the symptoms are
vague and hard to imagine, such as inflammation or a malfunctioning nervous
system. Thus, even when considering purely physical symptoms, those that are
easy to imagine seem more likely to occur. Id.
136Cass R. Sunstein, Dnel Khaneman, David Schkadc & Ilana Ritov,
PredictablyIncoherentJudgments, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1153, 1177 (2002).
37

1 Id. at 1173.
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Moreover, Sunstein and his colleagues point out that
138
physical injury is more prominent than nonphysical injury.
They explain that prominence may be difficult to define, but it is
a well-understood concept in the psychological literature. In an
experiment, Sunstein and his colleagues found that subjects
awarded higher punitive damages in a case involving egregious
fraud (financial harm) than in a products liability case involving
personal injury (physical harm) when they evaluated each case
in isolation, but they gave higher awards to the personal injury
case when they evaluated both cases together. 139 In other words,
the financial harm appeared less severe when compared to the
physical harm. Again, what we see in the asylum context is that
the prominence of physical harm in the analysis of persecution
not only makes nonphysical harm appear less severe, but may
actually lead adjudicators to ignore this form of harm
altogether. 140
B.

Involuntary Insertion of an Intrauterine Device
(IUD)

The same issues that emerge in the analysis of persecution
in FGM cases appear in the BIA's analysis of the harm related to
involuntary IUDs. Specifically, the BIA has applied a higher
standard for physical harm and has failed to consider
nonphysical harm. Under U.S. asylum law, it is clear that forced
abortions and forced sterilizations constitute persecution. In fact,
these acts constitute "persecution per se," since Congress
specifically amended the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA)
138
Id.
139

Id.; see also Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Bottom-Up Versus Top-Down

Lawmaking, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 933, 945-46 (2006) (discussing Sunstein etal.'s

experiments and arguing that such contrast effects are "far more likely to affect
judges, who see only one case at a tiuie, than legislatures, who can make broader
comparisons").
140 Consequently, although Sunstein and his colleagues note that a crosscategory comparison should "in most cases" improve "the quality of judgment"
by restoring differences between categories of harms that differ in prominence,

this reasoning does not seem to apply to the asylum context. Sunstein etal.,
supra note 136, at 1178. It may be that judges should award more damages in
personal injury cases and less money in financial fraud cases, but the issue of
damages is distinct from the question of how to evaluate physical and
nonphysical harm in analyzing persecution.
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to so provide.' 4 1 What has not been clear, however, is whether
involuntary insertion of an IUD, with or without forced
gynecological exams, constitutes persecution.
An IUD is a long acting contraceptive device, made of
plastic and sometimes copper, that is placed inside a woman's
uterus.' 42 Two-thirds of the world's IUD users are in China,
where it is the most widely used form of birth control,
surpassing sterilization. 43 In October 2008, the BIA issued its
decision in Matter of M-F-W-, holding that involuntary insertion
of an IUD, without aggravating circumstances, does not rise to
the level of persecution. Prior to that decision, several circuit
courts had published opinions that left open the door to the
possibility that involuntary insertion of an IUD could constitute
persecution. This section describes the legal landscape before
Matter ofM-F-W-, analyzes the BIA's reasoning in that case, and
discusses its aftermath.
1. The Open Door Before the BIA's Decision in
Matter of M-F-W- & L-GBefore Matter of M-F-W-, several circuits recognized the
possibility that involuntary insertion of an IUD could constitute
persecution. The Seventh Circuit, for example, remanded two
Congress passed the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
141
Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) in 1996. Section 601(a) of IIRIRA amended section
101(a)(42) of the Immigration and Nationality Act to provide:
A person who has been forced to abort a pregnancy or to undergo
involuntary sterilization, or who has been persecuted for failure or
refusal to undergo such a procedure or for other resistance to a
coercive population control program, shall be deemed to have been
persecuted on account of political opinion, and a person who has a
well founded fear that he or she will be forced to undergo such a
procedure or subject to persecution for such failure, refusal, or
resistance shall be deemed to have a well founded fear of persecution
on account of political opinion.
8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(42) (West 2011).
142 RICHARD EVAN JONES & KRISTIN H. LOPEz, HUMAN REPRODUCTIVE

BIOLOGY 394 (3d. ed., 2006).
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cases to the BIA specifically so that it could address this issue.
In Liin v. Ashcroft, where the Seventh Circuit reversed based on
an adverse credibility determination, it specifically noted that
"[t]he IJ did not determine whether Lin's three involuntary IUD
insertions and mandatory checkups could constitute
persecution."' 144 Subsequently, in Zheng v. Gonzales, the court
remanded a case where the BIA had merely "assumed that the
involuntary insertion of IUDs constitutes persecution pursuant to
a 'coercive population control program' in order for the BIA to
definitively 'decide the issue. 145 Similarly, in Yang v. U.S.
Attorney General, the Eleventh Circuit remanded a case to the
BIA so that it could determine, in the first instance, whether the
applicant had experienced past persecution on account of
resistance to China's coercive population control program. 146 In
that case, the applicant alleged that she was forcibly taken to the
and was subjected to two
hospital by five or six officials
47
involuntary IUD procedures. 1
The Fourth Circuit, which is the only circuit to squarely
address a claim based on this issue, found no past persecution in
Li v. Gonzales, where the alleged persecution was based on "the
single event of insertion of the IUD" in a medically routine
manner not involving force or abuse. 148 Significantly, the
petitioner in that case "challenge[d] only the insertion of the
IUD as mistreatment constituting persecution," so the court's
holding was "correspondingly narrow.' 1' 49 The court specifically
noted that
Li [did] not argue that the harms and injuries
associated with compelled IUD usage-such
as the continuing invasion of her most intimate
144Lin v. Ashcroft, 395 F.3d 748, 757 (7th Cir. 2004).
145 Zheng v. Gonzales, 409 F.3d 804, 806 (7th Cir. 2005) (emphasis

added).
146Yang v. U.S. Att'y. Gen., 418 F.3d

147Id. at 1204.
148Li v. Gonzales, 405 F.3d at 179.
49

1

Id.

1198, 1204-05 (1 Ith Cir. 2005)
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bodily privacy and the potentially indefinite
disabling of her reproductive capabilitywhen taken together with the flagrant violation
of personal privacy involved in the actual
insertion of the IUD, might150 collectively rise to
the level of "persecution."'
Thus, the court explicitly left open the possibility that, had
different arguments been raised on appeal, it may have reached
the opposite conclusion. Indeed, in forcefully setting forth the
arguments that the petitioner could have made, the court
appeared supportive of the idea that the collective harms
associated with involuntary insertion of an IUD may rise to the
level of persecution.
In 2007, the Second Circuit remanded Zheng v. Gonzales to
the BIA so that it could articulate, in a published opinion, "its
position concerning whether and under what conditions the
forced insertion of an IUD constitutes persecution.' 51 The court
remarked that "the BIA ha[d] not yet opined on this issue in a
published, precedential opinion, thus depriving the bench, the
bar, and potential asylum applicants of guidance concerning
whether and how they might approach the issue. Indeed, it
appears that the BIA has taken contrary positions on this
issue." 152 The court explained that "[i]n the instant case, the BIA
held that the involuntary insertion of an IUD, unaccompanied by
any 'significant degree of pain or restriction' did not constitute
persecution within the meaning of the INA," but in another nonprecedential decision arising in the Seventh Circuit, mentioned
above, it had assumed that the involuntary insertions of IUDs
constitute persecution. 5 3 In remanding the case, the court
specifically noted that it was "unclear from the BIA's opinion if
it considered whether emotional harm resulting from the
unwanted touching attendAnt to the forcibly insertion of an IUD
150

ld.

'I Zheng, 497 F.3d at 203-04.
152Id. at

203.

153 Id. (quoting the BIA decision in the instant case and referencing the
Seventh Circuit's decision in Zheng, 409 F.3d at 811 (7th Cir. 2005)).
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might constitute persecution within the meaning of the BIA,"
indicating that the BIA should address that issue in its opinion as
well.154 In response to this directive from the Second Circuit, the
BIA issued its published opinion in M-F-W-, discussed below.

154 I. at 204, 204

n.1.
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2.

The BIA's Decision In In re M-F-W- & L-GRequiring "Aggravating Circumstances" for
Involuntary Insertion of the IUD to Constitute
Persecution

In 2008, the BIA responded to the Second Circuit's
decision in Zheng with In re M-F-W- & L-G-. 155There, the BIA
found that "examples of routine acts implementing China's
family planning policy that are lacking in harm sufficient to
constitute persecution include reinsertion of an IUD after the
removal of an IUD" and "regularly required gynecological
exams." 156 The Board reasoned that "[w]hile having an IUD
inserted involuntarily is certainly intrusive and hinders a person's
ability to control procreation, the temporary nature of its effects
persuades us that such a procedure does not constitute
persecution per se."'157 The B1A distinguished insertion of an
IUD from forced abortion and sterilization, which, as noted
above, automatically provide a basis for asylum under the
statute,' 58 reasoning that "using an IUD does not generally have
permanent effects, other than the loss of time during which to
conceive."'1 59 The BIA further found that, "under normal
circumstances, the IUD user does not lose a child or the
permanent opportunity to have a child.' 60 Based on this
reasoning, the BIA concluded that "simply requiring a woman to
use an IUD, and other more routine methods of China's
implementation of its family planning policy,

155
Matter of M-F-W- & L-G-, 24 1. & N. Dec. 633.
156
Id. at 641.

157
Id. at 640 (emphasis added).
158See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
159Matter of M-F-W- & L-G-, 24 I. & N. Dcc. at 640.
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do not generally rise to the level of hann required to establish
persecution."' 161 The Board clarified, "We do not intend to imply
that having an IUD inserted can never- be found to be
persecution. However, to rise to the level of harm necessary to
constitute 'persecution,' the 62insertion of an IUD must involve
aggravating circumstances.'
While the BIA did not explain or define aggravating
circumstances, it referenced its decisions in two prior
unpublished cases, which, read together, provide some sense of
what this term means. First, the BIA discussed the decision that
the Second Circuit reviewed in Zheng v. Gonzales, where the
BIA had found "involuntary insertion of an IUD,
unaccompanied by any 'significant degree ofpain or restriction'
did not constitute persecution within the meaning of the
[Act].' 63 In Zheng, the BIA had noted that the IUD is "a method
of birth control . . . commonly used in this country as well as
many other parts of the world."' 64 The widespread use of IUDs
"compelled the BIA to find 'nothing so inherently egregious
about the procedure to lead us to conclude that the applicant was
persecuted'."' 165 When the BIA explained its Zheng decision in
M-F-W-, it offered a somewhat different rationalization, stating
that it had been "relatively simple . . .to decide that past
persecution had not been established," because "[t]he alien had
had an IUD inserted and waited 11 years to have it66 removed," so
"the alien did not appear to resist the procedure."
Second, the BIA discussed the decision that the Seventh
Circuit reviewed in Zheng v. Gonzales (a different case with the
same name as the Second Circuit case), where the BIA had
assumed that the involuntary insertion of IUDs constitutes
161Id.
162Id.

at 642.

163Id. at 639 (emphasis added).
164Zheng, 497 F.3d at 202 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting the BIA's decision).
65

1

Id.

"66
Matter of M-F-W- & L-G-, 24 1.& N. Dec. at 640.
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persecution pursuant to a "coercive population control
program."'167 The BIA claimed that the different results in the
Second and Seventh Circuit cases did not reflect "an inconsistent
application of what we find to be persecution" but rather
stemmed from differences in "the facts of each case."'168 The
BIA went on to explain that in the Seventh Circuit case:
[T]he alien was repeatedly required to submit
to involuntary insertion of IUDs. The first
insertion resulted in an infection, bleeding,
headaches, and fatigue before the alien had
the IUD removed by a private doctor. IUDs
were then inserted on two more occasions, and
the alien had them removed. She fled for the
United States after the third IUD was
removed. The alien also provided evidence
that she and her husband were identified as
"Birth Planning Targets" by local family
69
planning officials. 1
The BIA's discussion, with apparent approval, of its decisions in
these cases arising in the Second and Seventh Circuits suggests
that the "aggravated circumstances" mentioned in M-F-Wrequire significant pain, physical complications such as infection
and bleeding, and/or repeated harm, such as multiple reinsertions
of an IUD. In focusing on "aggravated circumstances," the BIA
failed to mention some of the more routine physical side effects
of IUDs. For example, "the average monthly menstrual flow in
IUD users is more than in non IUD users," and "[a]bdominal
cramps, especially in the first few weeks after insertion, are
common." 170 Nor did the BIA note that, historically, widely used
IUDs were later discovered to cause problems such as pelvic
infections during pregnancies. When severe, "pelvic infection
can take the form of pelvic inflammatory disease, with the
danger of scarring the uterus and oviducts, resulting in
167Id. (quoting Zheng, 409 F.3d 804, 806 (7th Cir. 2005)).
168Id. at 639-40.

169Id. (citing Zheng, 409 F.3d at 810 (emphasis added)).
170JONES

& L6PEZ, supra note 142, at 394.
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infertility.' 17 1 Thus, significant physical harm may occur long
after the insertion of the IUD. The BIA also totally ignored
nonphysical aspects of the harm, as discussed further below.
3.

Analysis of In re M-F-W- & L-G-

The BlA's decision in M-F-W- is problematic for several
reasons. First, insofar as it requires significant pain, bodily
injury or similar aggravating circumstances for harm to amount
to persecution, it deviates from the general understanding of this
term. None of the definitions of persecution include such
factors, 172 and some circuit courts have explicitly rejected any
such requirement. 173 The Seventh Circuit, for example, has
"previously rejected attempts by the BIA to impose on asylum
applicants the additional burden of establishing permanent or
serious injuries as a result of their persecution.' 1 74 In fact, over a
decade ago, the Seventh Circuit sharply criticized the BIA for
applying "the wrong standard" in requiring an asylum applicant
7
to have serious injuries in order to demonstrate persecution. 1
Likewise, the Ninth Circuit reversed an immigration judge's
decision finding that the applicant's "electrocution with a rod
was not sufficient to present a case, of persecution, because she
did not report any resulting 'medical attention or sustained
injury'.'

t 76

The court held that an individual may establish

persecution "even where there are no long-term effects and the

171Id.
172See supra notes 25-26.

M73
See Quan v. Gonzales, 428 F.3d 883, 888-89 (9th Cir. 2005) ("Using
an clectrically-charged baton on a prisoner ... may constitute persecution, even
where there arc not long-term effects and the prisoner does not seek medical
attention."); Begzatowski, 278, F.3d at 655 (7th Cir. 2002).
174Begzatowski, 278 F.3d at 670 (citing Asani v. I.N.S., 154 F.3d 719,
722-23 (7th Cir. 1998)).
175Asani, 154 F.3d at 722-23 (reversing the BIA's finding of no past
persecution where an applicant was repeatedly detained and had his teeth
knocked out as a result of being beaten by the police).
176

Quan, 428 F.3d at 888.
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[applicant] does not seek medical attention. '177 Despite such
decisions by the circuit courts, the BIA failed to explain how its
new standard requiring aggravating circumstances fits with
existing case law and whether it is unique to cases involving
forced IUD insertion.
Second, although the IUD is placed inside a woman's
uterus and interferes with her reproductive functions, it is
unclear whether the BIA considered it a form of physical harm.
By citing its decision in Matter of T-Z-, a case that addresses
when nonphysical harm amounts to persecution, the BIA
indicated, rather surprisingly, that it may not even consider
involuntary IUD insertion to be a form of physical harm. 178 Such
reasoning is at odds with the Fourth Circuit's statement that an
involuntary IUD involves the "continuing invasion of [a
potentially
woman's] most intimate bodily privacy and the
179
indefinite disabling of her reproductive capability."
Third, despite citing T-Z-, and despite the Second Circuit's
specific notation that the BIA should consider the emotional
harm involved in forced IUD insertion in determining whether
the harm rises to the level of persecution, 180 the BIA failed to
take emotional harm into account. The BIA's actual analysis in
M-F-W- focused exclusively on the physical consequences of
IUD insertion, completely ignoring the harmful psychological
effects of an involuntary procedure that involves placing a
mechanical device inside a woman's uterus and results in her
inability to make reproductive choices or bear children for an
indefinite amount of time, not to mention the emotional hanrm
involved in the forced gynecological exams that accompany the
procedure. In Li v. Ashcrofi, where the Ninth Circuit found that
an aggressive forced pregnancy examination amounted to
persecution, the court noted that the petitioner described her
experience as "rape-like," and further opined that, "[g]iven her
refusal to consent to the physically invasive and emotionally
177

1d.

178Matter of M-F-W- & L-G-, 24 1.& N. Dcc. at 64 1.
79

1 Li, 405 F.3d

at 179 (4th Cir. 2005).

180Zheng, 497 F.3d at 204, & 204 n. 1.
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traumatic examination of her 'private parts,' this analogy is
certainly not far-fetched. 1 8 1 Rape has long been considered a
form of persecution, due not only to the physical harm, but also
the "severe and long-lasting" psychological harm that it
causes. 182 Moreover, in cases involving forced sterilization,
courts have stressed the "emotionally painful consequences"
caused by being "denied a procreative life" and "the society and
comfort of the child or children that might . . . have been
born.' 83 In light of the reasoning in these relevant cases, it was
a particularly glaring oversight for the BIA to fail to consider the
emotional effects of involuntary IUD insertion.
Fourth, the BIA overlooked or minimized the involuntary
nature of the procedure and the way that lack of consent
prevents women from making their own decisions about their
sexual and reproductive functions. In Fatin v. INS, the Third
Circuit noted that "governmental measures that compel an
individual to engage in conduct that is not physically painful or
harmful but is abhorrent to that individual's deepest beliefs" may
amount to persecution. 184 In fact, the court went further, stating
that "[s]uch conduct might be regarded as a form of 'torture'.' 8 5
The court suggested that for at least some women, "complying
with' Iran's gender-specific laws would be so profoundly
abhorrent that it could aptly be called persecution."' 186" In failing
181
Li, 356 F.3d at1158 & 1158 n.4.
182See, e.g., Lopez-Galarza v. I.N.S.,
99 F.3d 954, 962 (9th Cir. 1996); see
also U.N. HIGH COMM'N FOR REFUGEES, GUIDELINES ON INTERNATIONAL
PROTECTION: GENDER-RELATED PERSECUTION WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF ARTICLE
IA(2) OF THE 1951 CONVENTION AND/OR ITS 1967 PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE
9 (2002), available at http://www.unhcr.org/rcfworld/
STATUS OF REFUGEES
pdfid/3d36fl c64.pdf ("There is no doubt that rape and other forms of gender
related violence, such as dowry-related violence, female genital mutilation,
domestic violence, and trafficking, arc acts which inflict severe pain and
suffering-both mental and physical-and which have been used as forms of
persecution, whether perpetrated by State or private actors.").
183
Qu v. Gonzales, 399 F.3d 1195, 1202 (9th Cir 2005).
184Fatin v. I.N.S.,
12 F.3d 1233, 1242 (3d Cir. 1993).
185l,.
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to mention deprivation of the freedom to make reproductive
choices, the BIA overlooked another important aspect of the
harm experienced by women subjected to forced IUDs. Thus, the
BIA's decision in M-F-W- both raised the bar for the level of
physical harm required to establish persecution and failed to
analyze nonphysical forms of harm.
4.

The Legal Landscape After Matter of M-F-W-

Since the BIA issued its decision in M-F-W-, only the
Second and Third Circuits have had an opportunity to address
the BIA's interpretation of persecution in that case. The Second
Circuit has explicitly upheld the aggravated circumstances test,
finding it to be reasonable and entitled to deference under
Chevron, 187 and the Third Circuit has implicitly accepted this
test by applying it in cases where it was not challenged. Recent
precedential decisions from both circuits, however, highlight
serious problems and inconsistencies with the BIA's application
of this test that should caution other circuits against finding it
reasonable.

187The principles of deference established by Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) apply to the statutory
scheme of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C.A. § § 1101-:1503 (West
2011). See I.N.S. v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 425 (1999) (stating that the
BIA, which is vested with the Attorney General's discretion and authority in the
cases before it, "should be accorded Chevron deference as it gives ambiguous
statutory terms 'concrete meaning through a process of case-by-case
adjudication") (quoting Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 448-49). Chevron
provides that when "the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific
issue," the reviewing court should ask "whether the agency's answer is based on
a permissible construction of the statute." 467 U.S. at 843. Deference under
Chevron does not apply, however, when an agency's interpretation of a statutory
term conflicts with positions that it has taken in the past. See Nat'l Cable &
Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 981 (2005) (holding
that an "unexplained inconsistency is ...a reason for holding an interpretation to
be an arbitrary and capricious change from agency practice"). Some scholars
have aptly questioned whether the concept of*Chevron deference makes sense in
the context of asylum cases interpreting the definition of a refugee (which
includes the term "persecution"), as this definition stems from an international
treaty. See Bassina Farbenblum, Executive Deference in U.S. Refugee Law:
InternationalistPaths Through and Beyond Chevron, 60 DUKE L. J. 1059 (2011)
(arguing that the doctrine of deference should not be applied where the agency's
interpretation conflicts with international law).

COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF GENDER AND LAW

a.

The Second Circuit's Decisions in Xia Fan
Huang and Mei Fun Wong

In Huang, the Second Circuit issued its first published
decision in a case challenging the BIA's decision in M-F-W- as
an impermissible interpretation of the INA. 188 There, the
petitioner argued that M-F-W- was wrongly decided and not
entitled to Chevron deference. 89 Specifically, she argued that
"the cumulative effect of having an IUD inserted and regularly
examined constitutes sterilization."' 90 In addition, she argued
that "her forced IUD insertion, an invasive procedure that left a
device. in her body, constitutes persecution because it is a
'flagrant violation of fundamental rights, including the right to
reproductive choice and bodily integrity'."' 91 Alternatively, she
argued that "even if her forced IUD insertion does not constitute
persecution, the cumulative effect of the insertion plus invasive
192
quarterly check-ups does rise to the level of persecution."'
Applying the two-step inquiry set forth in Chevron, the
court first asked whether Congress had directly addressed the
Finding that it had not done so, the court
precise issue at hand. 193
moved to the second step, which required it to determine if the
agency's interpretation was a permissible construction of the
statute. With respect to the petitioner's first argument, the
Second Circuit found that "the BIA's conclusion that an
involuntary IUD insertion is not an involuntary sterilization is
permissible," noting that it was "reasonable" for the BIA to
distinguish the IUD as a "temporary measure," whereas
"sterilization makes one permanently incapable of having
children."194
118Xia

Fan Huang v. Holder, 591 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2010).

189Id. at 129 (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-44).
190Id.

191
Id. (quoting petitioner's bric).
92

1

Id.

193Id.; see also Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-44'(1984).

194Xia Fan Huang, 591 F.3d at 129.
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With regard to the petitioner's second argument
challenging the BIA's determination that involuntary IUD
insertion, or involuntary IUD insertion plus mandatory
gynecological check-ups, does not constitute persecution, the
court found that it did not need to reach this issue because the
petitioner "[did] not challenge the BIA's conclusion that she
failed to establish that the insertion of the IUD was or would be
on account of her resistance to China's family planning
policy."'1 95 Nor did she challenge the BIA's determination that
the persecution at issue must be the result of resistance to the
family planning policy in order to fall under the terms of statute.
In other words, since the petitioner had failed to argue that she
had satisfied the nexus requirement, which is a necessary
element for obtaining asylum, the court had an independent basis
for dismissing the appeal and did not need to address whether
the harm that she suffered rose to the level of persecution.
In a more recent decision, Mei Fun Wong, however, the
Second Circuit did reach the issue and found no error in the
BIA's interpretation that an involuntary IUD must be
accompanied by aggravating factors to constitute persecution. 196
While the Second Circuit properly noted some of the
nonphysical harms associated with forced insertion of an IUD,
including that it "involves a serious violation of personal privacy
and deprives a woman of autonomy in making decisions about
whether to bear a child,"'197 it found that the BIA had taken such
harm into consideration in M-F-W- by "acknowledging that
'having an IUD inserted is certainly intrusive and hinders a
person's ability to control procreation'.' ' 98 The language used by
the Second Circuit in describing the nonphysical harm is,
however, strikingly different than the language quoted from MF-W-, as the former indicates a serious rights violation whereas
the latter suggests mere inconvenience. Nevertheless, after
noting "[t]he difficulty with identifying the boundaries of such
195
Xia Fan Huang, 591 F.3d at 130.
196Mei Fun Wong v. Holder, 633 F.3d 64, 76 (2d Cir. 2011).
197 Id. at 72 (citing Qiao Hua Li v. Gonzales, 405 F.3d 171, 179 (4th Cir.

2005)).
198Id. (citing Matter of M-F-W & L-G-, 24 1. & N. Dec. at 640).
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as general concept [as] . . . persecution,"'

99

the Second Circuit

simply deferred to the BIA's interpretation of ambiguous
language in the statute, finding it reasonable under the two-step
Chevron analysis. 00
While the Second Circuit upheld the aggravating
circumstances test in Mei Fun Wong, it found that the BIA had
failed to explain adequately how it had applied that test to the
particular facts of the case. 20 1 Specifically, the court noted that
the BIA "had failed to indicate what, if any, weight, it assigned
to the involuntary IUD insertion itself in the aggravating
circumstances that were found to constitute persecution. '20 2 The
Court pointed out that "[b]y emphasizing that the detention
preceding the IUD insertion involved no beating or injury and
the IUD itself caused only 'discomfort,' the BIA's decision [in
M-F-W-] might be read to demand proof of aggravating
circumstances that would, by themselves, constitute
persecution. '20 3 The court was "not certain, however, that the
BIA intended to accord the involuntary procedure at issue-IUD
20 4
insertion-no weight in its persecution determination"
Urging the BIA that "it might well conclude that when such
a procedure is involuntary, it bears some weight in a persecution
determination," the court noted cases recognizing in other
contexts, such as rape, that "an act that may be voluntarily
20 5
undertaken can become persecution where consent is absent.
Oddly, the court did not see any irony in having to point this out
to the BIA, nor did it acknowledge any inconsistency between
the BIAs supposed recognition of the violations of privacy and
autonomy and its apparent failure to attribute any harm to the
199l,.
200/.

at 73.

201Id.

at 75.

202Mei
203
2

Id.

04 Id.

205

d.

Fun Wong, 633 F.3d at 76.
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132

involuntary IUD insertion itself. Indeed, the BIA's decision in
Wong's case undermines the notion that the BIA recognizes the
serious nonphysical harms associated with forced IUDs, as it
found that the facts merely "'paint a picture of discomfort
resulting from the routine implementation of the family planning
Wong was
policy, rather than persecution'." 20 6 Although
detained for three days preceding the forced insertion of the IUD
and forced to pay a fine, the BIA found that she "experienced no
persecutory harm, as might have been the case if she had also
been beaten or injured," emphasizing20 7its myopic focus on
physical injury in assessing persecution.
The Second Circuit's decision in Mei Fun Wong highlights
the practical difficulties in applying the BIA's aggravated
circumstances test, even if it is accepted in theory, as well as
more general inconsistencies in defining persecution. For
example, the court noted that the same harm that was found
insufficiently serious to constitute persecution in Wong was
deemed persecution in another case, Chao Qun Jiang.20 8 In
Jiang, a guard who committed the same acts of harm that Wong
suffered was barred from asylum for engaging in "persecution of
others," although the agency has not drawn any distinction in the
definition of persecution when applied to the perpetrator as
opposed to the victim. 20 9 The Second Circuit reasoned that it
could not conduct any meaningful review without "some
explanation of how the two decisions can be reconciled."2 10
The background context against which the Second Circuit
renders its decision in Wong may help explain why it deferred to
the BIA's aggravated circumstances test under Chevron, despite
stressing the inconsistencies and inherent difficulties in applying

206 Id. at 75-76 (emphasis added).
207Id. at 76.
208Mei Fun Wong, 633 F.3d at 77 (citing Chao Qun Jiang v. U.S. Bureau
of Citizenship and Immigration Servs.., 520 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 2008)).

209Id. (citing Jiang,520 F.3d at 135 n.5).
2 10

Id.
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that approach. 2"'
The court begins by subtly invoking a
culturally relativistic view of human rights. In stating that "other
governments' restraints on freedom strike us as oppressive"
because "few societies have valued individual liberty as strongly
as our own or erected such high legal barriers to government
intrusion on personal freedom,"2 12 the court suggests that any
rights violations we associate with forced IUD usage (such as
violations of privacy and autonomy) may be due to our own
cultural values, and thereby implies that individuals from other
cultures that do not share these values may not experience forced
IUD usage as oppressive in the same way that we would.
The court then explicitly invokes the perennial fear of
opening the floodgates, noting that China is "a country of more
than 1.3 billion people," so the "potential applicants for asylum
in the United States" fleeing from the one-child policy could
"easily number in the millions." 213 As a matter of legal principle,
of course the number of potential asylum applicants fleeing a
certain form of harm is irrelevant to determining whether that
type of harm constitutes persecution. Lastly, the court inflames
fears of asylum fraud, commenting on "the ease with -which
opposition to the state's population policy might be invoked to
support asylum claims by large numbers of Chinese nationals
whose real reason for seeking entry into the United States is the
historic motivation for generations of immigrants: the search for
better economic opportunities. '2t 4 As discussed in Part III infra,
embracing a human rights approach to defining persecution
would help avoid the influence of these irrelevant yet
emotionally and politically compelling factors in analyzing the
concept of persecution.

21 As noted above, when an agency's interpretations arc inconsistent,
Chevron deference is not appropriate. See supra note 187 (discussing Brand X,
545 U.S. at 981).

212
Mei Fun Wong, 633 F.3d at 69 (citing Zhou Yun Zhang v. I.N.S.,
386 F.
3d 66, 70 (2d Cir. 2004)).
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b.

The Third Circuit's Decision in Fei Mei
Cheng

The Third Circuit has also recently issued a precedent
decision regarding involuntary insertion of an IUD, which
implicitly accepted the "aggravated circumstances" test but
215
found that the BIA had erred in finding no past persecution.
The facts of Fei Mei Cheng once again underscore the BIA's
failure to consider cumulative nonphysical forms of harm,
including severe psychological harm and economic deprivation,
in assessing persecution. Fei Mei Cheng lived in China's Fujian
Province and was not permitted to marry her boyfriend, Chen,
because she was under twenty-three years old. 2 16 After Cheng
became pregnant, officials threatened to terminate her pregnancy
by force. 2t 7 When she resisted these threats by fleeing to another
town, officials came to her parents' home in the middle of the
night and threatened to seize her parents' family farm and truck,
the source of the family's livelihood, if Cheng did not abort her
pregnancy. 218 After Cheng continued to defy these threats and
gave birth to her child, officials not only confiscated her family's
farm but also prevented all of her family members from working
on it. They also ordered that Cheng and her boyfriend be
he became involved in
sterilized, and they detained Chen after 219
an altercation with a government official.

While Chen was detained, officials escalated the pressure
on Cheng, threatening to take her baby from her and to detain
her boyfriend for months if she did not comply with the
sterilization order. 220 The officials then "sweetened the deal" by
telling Cheng she could keep the baby and that her boyfriend
215Fei Mci Chcng v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 623 F.3d 175 (3d Cir. 2010). It does

not appear that the petitioner in this case challenged the aggravated
circumstances test. Rather, she challenged how it applied to her case.
2 16

Id. at 179.

2171d.
21

8Id.

219Id.
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would be released and her parents' farm and truck would be
22 1
returned to them if she simply agreed to insertion of an IUD.
222
IUD.
the
to
Under such enormous pressure, Cheng acceded
She was immediately "dragged" to a minivan and driven to a
medical clinic, where she was forced ' to23have the IUD inserted, a
process that she found "very painful. 2
After insertion of the IUD, she was "required to submit to
gynecological examinations every three months in order to
verify the IUD's presence. ''224 Missing an appointment resulted
in the assessment of a fine that Cheng "could not afford to
pay. '"225 When Cheng's daughter became old enough to enter
daycare, the township initially forbade her from attending and
then required Cheng to pay twice the tuition due to her violation
of the family planning policy. Before fleeing to the United
States, Cheng became terrified after learning that her neighbor
was forcibly sterilized for attempting to have a baby in secret.
Her neighbor was "treated 'like a pig'-her lands and legs were
tied, she was not given sufficient anesthesia, and she screamed
' 26
throughout the operation. 2
The immigration judge found no past persecution in
Cheng's case but initially granted asylum based on a wellfounded fear of future persecution. 227 After the case was
remanded by the BIA, for consideration. of M-F-W-, the IJ
denied asylum and the BIA affirmed in an unpublished decision,
relying on M-F-W-.228 The BIA reasoned that the insertion of
Cheng's IUD "did not occur under sufficiently aggravating
221Fei Mei Cheng, 623 F.3d at 179.
222

223

Id. at 179-180.

1d. at 180.

224
Id.
225Id.
226ld.

227Fei Mei Cheng, 623 F.3d at 180-8 1.
228

1 d.

at 181-82.
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circumstances to constitute persecution," despite officials'
repeated threats to sterilize her and her boyfriend, the
confiscation of her parents farm resulting in the loss of their
livelihood, her boyfriend's detention, and the threats to take
away her child, all forms of intense psychological harm distinct
from the harm caused by the insertion of the IUD itself.229
On appeal, the Third Circuit, like the Second Circuit, gave
deference to the BIA's interpretation of the term sterilization as
being distinct from involuntary insertion of an IUD, finding it
reasonable under Chevron's two-step analysis. 230 However, the
Third Circuit rejected the BIA's finding that Cheng had not
experienced persecution. The Third Circuit implicitly accepted
the aggravated circumstances test by applying it (the decision
does not indicate that Cheng challenged the test itself), but found
no substantial evidence supporting the BIA's finding that there
were no aggravating circumstances, agreeing with Cheng that
the BIA had missed the numerous forms of harm she had
suffered. 231 Specifically, the Third Circuit found that the Board
(1) failed to consider the serious threats leveled at Cheng,
including officials' threats to take away her child and detain her
boyfriend for months; (2) failed to mention her credible
testimony that "the IUD insertion procedure was performed in a
hurried and improper manner that caused her extreme pain"; and
(3) "did not adequately address the significance of the financial
hardships imposed upon Cheng in direct response to her
resistance to the family planning officials' orders. '232 The Third
Circuit's decision stressed the case law finding that serious
233
threats and economic deprivation could constitute persecution.
Thus, the BIA's decision in Cheng's case reflects both of the
serious errors discussed in this Article: the failure to consider
nonphysical forms of harm and the application of a higher
standard for physical harm that involves women's sexual and
229

Id.at

182.

230Id. at

184-88.

231Id. at

191-93.

232Id. at

193-94.

233Fei Mei

Cheng, 623 F.3d at 193-94.
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reproductive functions. Luckily for Cheng, the Third Circuit
caught these errors.
Both the Second Circuit's decision in Wong and the Third
Circuit's decision in Cheng flag serious problems with the way
that the BIA applies the aggravated circumstances test. If the
BIA cannot apply its own test properly and consistently in a way
that does not conflict with federal precedents, one must question
whether the test itself is clear enough to set forth a reasonable
legal standard. So far, the Second Circuit's decision in Wong is
the only published decision analyzing the aggravated
circumstances test under Chevron, although the Third and Fourth
Circuits appear to have adopted this test implicitly without
analysis. 234 As of the date of this writing, it remains an open
question whether the other circuit courts will defer to the BIA's
interpretation of persecution in M-F-W-.
Due to the numerous inconsistencies likely to flow from
M-F-W-, and the case's profound mischaracterization of the
concept of persecution, courts should find that the aggravated
circumstances test is not a reasonable interpretation and does not
deserve deference. Asylum applicants cannot count on the circuit
courts to catch errors since only eight percent of decisions by
immigration judges are appealed to the BIA, 235 and only about
twenty-seven percent of the BIA's decisions are appealed to the
federal courts, 236 which means that the chance of an I's decision
234 Id.; Huang v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 620 F.3d 372, 380 n.5 (3d Cir. 2010)
("Mandatory birth control measures short of abortion or sterilization, such as
insertion of an IUD or required gynecological screenings, do not, on their own,
rise to the level of persecution and therefore cannot be the sole support for an
award of asylum."); Ni v. Holder, 613 F.3d 415, 430 n.12 (4th Cir. 2010) ("[T]he
BIA held that requiring a woman to use an IUD does not amount to persecution
absent aggravating circumstances .... We have since adopted that conclusion in
an unpublished opinion.").
235 EOIR

FY 2010,supra note 15.

236 See Stephen H. Legomsky, Resitructuring Immigration Adjudication,

59 DUKE L.J. 1635, 1658 (2010) (noting that 8,890 petitions for review of BIA
decisions were filed with the circuit courts in 2009); EOIR FY 2010, supra note
15, (stating that the BIA completed about 33,102 cases in 2009). Combining
these figures, the percent of BIA decisions appealed to the circuit courts appears
to be approximately twenty-seven percent.
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being reviewed by a federal judge is only around two percent.
Given this low rate of judicial review, it makes no sense to adopt
a test that will be extremely difficult for immigration judges to
apply and that has already led to inconsistent and legally
unsound results, as the decisions discussed above demonstrate.
The BIA and circuit courts must find a more legally sound way
to analyze persecution. As discussed below, a human rights
approach to analyzing persecution provides a more principled
pathway than an ad hoc test like aggravated circumstances,
which applies only to certain types of harm.
Il.

An International Human Rights Approach
Analyzing Sexual and Reproductive Harm

to

U.S. adjudicators of asylum claims are clearly struggling to
determine when harm rises to the level of persecution. The two
examples discussed above, FGM and involuntary IUDs, suggest
that adjudicators are especially hesitant to find that sexual and
reproductive harm rise to the level of persecution when they are
widespread and when even more extreme forms of the harm
exist in the world. Such factors, however, are irrelevant to a
proper legal analysis of persecution. In this section, the Article
argues that U.S. asylum law would benefit from a more
objective, norm-based definition of persecution and that
international human rights law provides the appropriate
framework. Specifically, this section contends that an
international human rights framework would help ensure the
consistent analysis of all types of harm, including forms of harm
directed primarily at women, and would highlight the
nonphysical types of harm that adjudicators currently tend to
ignore, especially violations of intangible rights that go to the
core of human dignity.
Applying a human rights analysis to the particular issues at
hand, this section demonstrates that Type I FGM and involuntary
insertion of an IUD both constitute persecution without any
"aggravating factors," and that such factors are not required for
FGM to constitute "severe past persecution." Finally, this section
concludes that without a more comprehensive and coherent
analysis of persecution, gender-related asylum claims in
particular will be wrongfully denied.
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A. Conceptualizing Persecution As a Serious Violation
of Human Rights
The dominant approach in the international community
when analyzing persecution is to use international human rights
law as the relevant framework. 237 This approach makes sense
because the UN Convention on the Status of Refugees is an
238
international treaty and should have an international meaning.
Moreover, the text, context, and purpose of the Refugee
Convention support using human rights as the relevant
standard. 239 In particular, the Preamble highlights the Universal
of
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the enjoyment
240
"fundamental rights and freedoms without discrimination.

237 JAMES C. HATHAWAY, THE LAW OF REFUGEE STATUS 108 (1991)
("The dominant view..., is that refugee law ought to concern itself with actions
which deny human dignity in any key way."); FOSTER, supra note 31, at 75
(stating that "the human rights framework for interpreting key aspects of the
refugee definition" has become "the dominant approach in refugee status
determination").
238FOSTER, supra note 3 1, at 49-50.

239Id. at 36-50; Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31, May
23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980) [hereinafter
VCLT]. Since the VCLT postdates the Refugee Convention, it is not strictly
applicable. Id. at art. 4 ("[T]he Convention applies only to treaties which are
concluded by States after the entry into force of the present Convention.").
However, the VCLT "nevertheless constitutes an authoritative statement of
customary public international law on the interpretation of treaties." Refugee
Appeal No.74665/03, slip op. para. 45 (Refugee Status App. Auth. July 7, 2004)
(N.Z.); see also Mora v. New York, 524 F.3d 183, 196 n.19 (2d. Cir. 2008)
("Although the United States has not ratified the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties, our Court relies upon it 'as an authoritative guide to the customary
international law of treaties,' insofar as it reflects actual state practices .... The
Department of State considers the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties an
authoritative guide to eurrent treaty law and practice.") (citations omitted).
2401951 Convention, supra note I. The permissible sources set forth in
Article 31(2) of the VCLT, supra note 239, for examining the context of a treaty
include the Preamble; -see also UNHCR, HANDBOOK ON PROCEDURES AND
60 (1992) (recognizing the
CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS

significance of the preamble); Golder v. United Kingdom, 18 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser.
A) at 16 (1975) ("the preamble is generally very useful for the determination of
the 'object' and 'purpose' of the instrument to be construed.").
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Scholars have proposed various ways of using international
human rights law to analyze the concept of persecution. James
Hathaway's influential work defines persecution as a "sustained
or systemic violation of basic human rights demonstrative of a
failure of state protection." 241 He proposes the following
hierarchy of obligation in analyzing persecution. First, a
violation of rights set forth in UDHR and codified in the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),
for which no derogation is permitted, almost always constitutes
persecution. 242 Rights in this category that are often relevant to
the analysis of sexual and reproductive harm include the right to
be free from torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment,
243
as well as freedom of thought, conscience, and religion.
Second, a violation of rights set forth in the UDHR and codified
in the ICCPR, from which derogation is permitted during a
public emergency, generally constitutes persecution unless the
derogation is strictly required and applied in a nondiscriminatory
way.244 Relevant rights in this category include protection of

241HATHAWAY, supra note 237, at
2 42

104-05.

Id.at 109.

243 See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 4(2), Dec.
16, 1996, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinaftcr ICCPR] ("No derogation from Articles
6, 7, 8 (paragraphs I and 2), II, 15, 16 and 18 may bc made under this
provision."). Article 7 of the ICCPR pertains to torture and cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment, while Article 18 pertains to freedom of thought, conscience
and religion.
244 HATHAWAY,

supra note 237, at 109; ICCPR, supra note 243, at art.

4(l) ("In time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation and the
existence of which is officially proclaimed, the States Parties to the present

Covenant may take measures derogating from their obligations under the present
Covenant to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation,
provided that such measures are not inconsistent with their other obligations
under international law and do not involve discriminationsolely on the ground of
race, colour sex, language,religion or socialorigin." (emphasis added)).
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personal and family privacy and integrity, as well as the right to
equal protection. 245
Third, a violation of rights set forth in the UDHR and
codified in the International Covenant of Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights (ICESCR) constitutes persecution if the state
ignores these interests despite the ability to respond or acts in a
discriminatory way. 246 Unlike the ICCPR, the ICESCR provides
for "progressive realization" of rights, requiring states to take
steps to the "maximum of available resources. 2 47 Relevant
rights in this category include the right to health and protection
of the family. 248 Finally, the fourth category includes violations
of rights in the UDHR that are not codified in either the ICCPR
or ICESCR, which generally do not constitute persecution
because these rights are not subject to binding legal
obligations. 249 Michelle Foster proposes a modification to
Hathaway's approach, focusing on the core and periphery of
each right rather than the concept of derogation.2 5 0 She argues
that adjudicators of asylum claims should first ask whether there
is a human rights violation and, if so, determine the seriousness
of the violation by looking to see if the core of the right has been
violated.

245 ICCPR, supra note 243, at art. 17(1) ("No one shall be subjected to
arbitrary or unlawful interfcrence with his privacy, family, home or
correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honor and reputation.") and art.
26 ("[T]he law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons
equal and effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as race,
colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social
origin, property, birth or other status.").
246

HATHAWAY, supra note 237, at 110-11; International Covenant of
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, 993
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR].
247 ICESCR,

supra note 246, at art. 2(l).

248Id. art. 10 ("The widest possible protection and assistance should be
accorded to the family..."); id. art. 12 (protecting "the right of everyone to the
enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health").
249HATHAWAY,
25

supra note 237, at I11.

0 FOSTER, supranote

3 1,at 201-13.
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An objection that some may make to the human rights
approach is that the U.S. has not ratified several of the major
human rights treaties, and that it has ratified the ICCPR subject
to various reservations. However, the United States' failure to
ratify those treaties does not mean that the treaties cannot serve
as the point of reference for interpreting another treaty that the
United States has ratified, namely the 1951 Refugee Convention.
The issue is not whether the U.S. or any other country has
binding obligations under the human rights treaties, but whether
these treaties provide appropriate guidance for interpreting the
Refugee Convention. "Even Justice Scalia, generally a stalwart
critic of applying foreign authority in the constitutional context,
acknowledges the utility of foreign precedent when the Court
interprets treaties." 25 ' It seems especially appropriate to use an
international human rights framework in evaluating asylum
cases related to gender since gender-based persecution entered
U.S. law through this type of human rights analysis. As Deborah
Anker has explained, it was the advent of gender issues that
pioneered the human rights approach. 252 Indeed, many circuit
courts have already acknowledged that the practice of FGM is
internationally recognized as a violation of the rights of women

251 Steven

Arrigg Koh, "Respectful Consideration "After Sanchez-Llamas

v. Oregon: Why the Supreme Court Owes More to the International Court.of

Justice, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 243, 249 (2007) (citing Olympic Airways v.
Husain, 540 U.S. 644, 660 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("We can, and should,
look to decisions of other signatories when we interpret treaty provisions.
Foreign constructions are evidence of the original shared understanding of the
contracting parties.")).
252Anker, supra note 3, at 138.
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and girls. 253 Courts also routinely cite the UNHCR254Handbook,
which links persecution to a breach of human rights.
B.

Applying An International Human Rights Law
Analysis To Sexual and Reproductive Harm

Sexual and reproductive autonomy represents "[o]ne of the
most important fronts in the struggle for women's human
rights," as well as one of "the most challenging issues for human
rights defenders."2' 55 These issues remains so challenging, in
part, due to "widespread deference to cultural and religious
values when it comes to issues of sexuality and women's control
over their reproductive choices. '256 Defenders of women's
sexual and reproductive rights seek not only to end gender-based
violence, but also to affirm "an emancipatory vision of human
rights, one which sees bodily and sexual integrity as integral to
human flourishing, well-being and dignity as freedom of

253 Abay v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 634, 638 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing U.N.
Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, CEDAW General
Recommendation No. 14: Female Circumcision, $ 438, U.N. DOC. A/45/38
(1990); Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women art. 2(a),
G.A. Res. 48/104, U.N. DOC.
A/RES/48/104 (Dec. 20, 1993) [hereinafter DEVAW] (including female genital
mutilation as an example of violence covered by the resolution); Traditional or
Customary Practices Affecting the Health of Women and Girls, G.A. Rcs.
56/128, U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/128 (Jan. 30, 2002). (reaffirming that female
genital mutilation "constitutes a definite form of violence against women and
girls and a serious violation of their human rights")); Mohammed, 400 F.3d at
795 ("The practice has been internationally recognized as a violation of the
rights of women and girls.").
254 U.N. HIGH COMM'N FOR REFUGEES, HANDBOOK ON PROCEDURES AND
CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS UNDER THE 1951 CONVENTION
5 1,U.N.
AND THE 1967 PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES,

Doc. HCR/IP/4/Eng/REV.I (Jan. 1992) ("[A] threat to life or freedom on account
of race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership of a particular
social group is always persecution. Other serious violations of human rights-for
the same reasons-would also constitute persecution.").
255 Defenders of Sexual and Reproductive Rights, AMNESTY INT'L (Nov.
10, 2007), http://www.amnesty.org/cn/human-rights-defendcrs/issues/challengcs/
srr-dcfenders.
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conscience or belief Indeed, autonomy of one's intimate,
25 7
affective and family life is itself an issue of conscience.
Gathering in Cairo in 1994, one-hundred and eighty
.nations signed the International Conference on Population and
Development Action Plan, a historic agreement that set forth
numerous principles on women's rights. This was the first time
that an international document clearly stated that women had the
right to determine their own reproduction. 258 It was also "the
first major UN document that defined women as independent
sexual beings, not merely child-bearers or mothers."2 59 Since
then, numerous treaties and declarations have reaffirmed
women's rights to sexual and reproductive autonomy. As
discussed below, both FGM and involuntary IUDs, which
restrict and control women's sexuality and reproductive capacity,
constitute serious violations of women's human rights and
therefore rise to the level of persecution.
1. Applying a Human Rights Analysis to FGM
If we apply an international human rights analysis to the
issue of FGM, it becomes clear that all types of FGM constitute
persecution. The United Nations Human Rights Committee,
which is charged with interpreting and monitoring states'
compliance with the ICCPR, has found that FGM violates
Article 7's prohibition on torture and cruel, inhuman, or

257Id.
258 Report of the International Conference on Population and
Development, Cairo, Egypt, Sept. 5-13, 1994, Principles,princ. 4, U.N. Doc. A/
CONF. 171/13, Annex ch. ii (Oct. 18, 1994).

259Kavita N. Ramdas, President of the Global Fund for Women, Op-Ed.,
Why Women's Reproductive Freedom Ensures Our Survival, INTER PRESS SERV.,

Jan. 8, 2010, available at http://ipsncws.net/news.asp?idnews=49913.
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degrading treatment,2 60 as well as Article 3 and Article 24, which
provide for the equal treatment of men and women and the

260 U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comments Adopted by the
Human Rights Committee Under Article 40, Paragraph 4 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: General Comment No. 28: Equality of
Rights Between Men and Women (article 3), II, U.N. DOc. CCPR/C/21/Rev. I/
Add.10 (Mar. 29, 2000); see also U.N. Human Rights Comm., Consideration of
Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant:
Intemational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Concluding Observations
of the Human Rights Committee: Uganda, 10, U.N. DOC. CCPR/CO/80/UGA
(May 4, 2004); U.N. Human Rights Comm., Consideration of Reports Submitted
by States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant: International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights: Concluding Observations of the Human Rights
Committee: Mali,
I1, U.N. DOc. CCPR/CO/77/MLI (Apr. 16, 2003); U.N.
Human Rights Comm., Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties
Under Article 40 of the Covenant: Intemational Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights: Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Sweden, 8,
U.N. DOc. CCPR/CO/74/SWE (Apr. 24, 2002); U.N. Human Rights Comm.,
Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the
Covenant: Intemational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Concluding
Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Yemen, I1, U.N. DOc. CCPR/
CO84/YEM (Aug. 9, 2005); U.N. Human Rights Comm., Consideration of
Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant:
Intemational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Concluding Observations
of the Human Rights Committee: Gambia, 10, U.N. Doc. CCPR/CO/75/GMB
(Aug. 12, 2004); U.N. Human Rights Comm., Consideration of Reports
Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant: International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Concluding Observations of the Human
Rights Committee: Lesotho,
12, U.N. DOc. CCPR/C/79/Add.106 (Apr. 8,
1999); U.N. Human Rights Comm., Consideration of Reports Submitted by
States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant: Intemational Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights: Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee:
Netherlands, II, U.N. DOc. CCPR/CO/72/NET (Aug. 27, 2001).
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protection of children.

61

Moreover, the UN Special Rapporteur
on Torture has stated,"[l]ike torture, female genital mutilation
(FGM) involves the deliberate infliction of severe pain and
suffering. 2 62 He points out the psychological and physical harm
caused by FGM, stressing that "[t]he pain inflicted by FGM does
not stop with the initial procedure, but often continues as
He also
ongoing torture throughout a woman's life. ' 263
underscores the "element of powerlessness," noting that FGM is
torture even if the procedure is medicalized and performed in a
hospital. 264 This represents a very different way of understanding
harm than focusing simply on the extent of pain, bodily injury,
and any medical complications, as asylum adjudicators tend to
261For concluding observations regarding violations of Article 3 see U.N.
Human Rights Comm., Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties
Under Article 40 of the Covenant: International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights: Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Central
II, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/CAF/C02 (July 27, 2006); U.N.
African Republic,
Human Rights Comm., Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties
Under Article 40 of the Covenant: International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights: Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Nigeria,
291, 296, U.N. Doc. CCPRJC/79/Add.65 (July 24, 1996); U.N. Human Rights
Comm., Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40
of the Covenant: Intemational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights:
12, U.N.
Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Senegal,
Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.82 (Nov. 19, 1997); U.N. Human Rights Comm.,
Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the
Covenant: International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Concluding
12, U.N. Doc.
Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Zimbabwe,
CCPR/C/79/Add.89 (Apr. 6, 1998).
For concluding observations regarding violations of Article 24 see U.N.
Human Rights Comm., Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties
Under Article 40 of the Covenant: International Covenant on Civil and Political
10,
Rights: Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Sudan,
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.85 (Nov. 19, 1997); U.N. Human Rights Comm.,
Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the
Covenant: International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Concluding
12, U.N. Doc.
Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Zimbabwe,
CCPR/C/79/Add.89 (Apr. 6, 1998).
262U.N. Human Rights Comm., Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
Doc. AIHRC/7/3 (Jan. 15, 2008) (citations omitted).
263Id.

5 1.

50 U.N.
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do. By taking the firm position that "any act of FGM would
amount to torture," the Special Rapporteur clearly rejects
distinctions based on the type of FGM performed.265
Applying Hathaway's method of analyzing persecution
with the UN's interpretations in mind, must conclude that all
forms of FGM amount to persecution as violations of both the
nonderogable and derogable provisions of the ICCPR. This
understanding of FGM is also consistent with the interpretation
of the UNHCR, which is the highest international authority for
interpreting the Refugee Convention. In May 2009, the UNHCR
issued a Guidance Note stating that it "considers FGM to be a
form of gender-based violence that inflicts severe harm, both
2 66
mental and physical, and amounts to persecution.
Recognizing that "[a]ll forms of FGM are considered
harmful" 267and that "[a]lmost all those who are subjected to
FGM experience extreme pain and bleeding, 268 the UNHCR
concluded that "[a]ll forms of FGM violate a range of human
rights of girls and women.'1269 Specifically, the UNHCR noted

that FGM violates the right to non-discrimination,270 to
protection from physical and mental violence,27' to the highest

265

Id.

53.

266U.N. HIGH COMM'N ON REFUGEES: GUIDANCE ON FGM, supra note

54,

7.
267

Id. 4.

266 Id.
5; see also id. 4 (stating "fo]ther health complications include
shock, psychological trauma, infections, urine retention, damage to the urethra

and anus, and even death.").
2 69

1d.

7.

270 Id. (citing International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 3,
Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]; CEDAW arts. 2, 5).
271

1d. (citing CRC art. 19; Declaration on the Elimination of Violence
Against Women art. 2(a), G.A. Res. 48/104, U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/104 (Dec. 20,
1993) [hereinafter DEVAW]).
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health, 272 and, "in the most extreme cases,
attainable standard2 of
73
life.
to
right
the
to
The interpretations of other UN Committees, including the
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against
Women (CEDAW Committee), the Committee on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights (ESCR Committee), and the
Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC Committee), further
deepen our understanding of the harms caused by FGM by
emphasizing both physical and nonphysical aspects of the harm.
For example, without differentiating between different types of
FGM, the CEDAW Committee has noted the "serious health and
other consequences" of FGM2 74 and listed it among "practices
involving violence or coercion," 275 explaining that such practices
stem from "[t]raditional attitudes by which women are regarded
as subordinate to men or as having stereotyped roles" and
constitute "a form of ... control of women. '276 In its concluding

272Id. (citing International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights art. 12, Dec. 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3; CRC art. 24).
273Id. (citing ICCPR art. 6; CRC art. 6).
274U.N. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women,
CEDAW General Recommendation No. 14: Female Circumcision, U.N. Doc. A/
45/38 (1990); see also U.N. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination
Against Women, General Recommendation No. 25, on article 4, paragraph I, of
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women, on Temporary Special Measures, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/Rev.7 (2004)
(using the term "female genital mutilation" rather than "female circumcision,"
which was previously used).
275U.N. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women,
General Recommendation No. 19: Violence Against Worien, II, U.N. Doc. A/
47/38. (1993) [hereinafter General Recommendation No. 19].
276

Id.
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observations on country reports, the CEDAW Committee has
also stressed that FGM discriminates against women. 277
The CEDAW Committee goes on to describe the full range
of ways that such violence affects women, stating that "[tihe
effect of such violence on the physical and mental integrity of
women is to deprive them the equal enjoyment, exercise and
knowledge of human rights and fundamental freedoms" and that
"the underlying consequences of these forms of gender-based
violence help to maintain women in subordinate roles and
contribute to the low level of political participation and to their
lower level of education, skills and work opportunities. ' 278 The
Committee stressed that gender-based violence has many
aspects, including "physical, mental or sexual harm or
suffering," and enumerated the various rights that such acts
violate, including the right to life, the right not to be subject to
torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, the right to
liberty and security of person, the right to equal protection under
the law, the right to equality in the family, and the right to the
highest standard attainable of physical and mental health.279
The ECSR Committee has likewise condemned "harmful
traditional cultural practices and norms" such as FGM that
"deny [women] their full reproductive rights."280 CESCR has
explained that the right to health encompasses "the right to
277 See, e.g., Rep. of the Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination
Against Women, 22d Sess., Jan. 17-Feb. 4, 2000, 23d Sess., June 12-30, 2000,
U.N. Doc. A/55/38; GAOR, 57th Sess., Supp. No. 38 (2000) [hereinafter
54-54
CEDAW Rep. 20001 (reporting on Burkina Faso); CEDAW Rep. 2000
215 (reporting on the
(reporting on Cameroon); CEDAW Rep. 2000

Democratic Republic of the Congo); Rep. of the Comm. on the Elimination of
Discrimination Against Women, at 66, 207, U.N. Doc. A/49/38; GAOR, 49th
Sess., Supp. No. 38 (1994) (reporting on the Netherlands); Rep. of the Comm. on
the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 13th Sess., 721 U.N. Doe.
A/29/38; GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. No. 38 (Apr. 12, 1994).

278General Recommendation No. 19, supra note 275,
2791d.
280 Id.

I1.

6.
21. Likewise, with respect to children and adolescents, the

Committee noted the "need to adopt effective and appropriate measures to
abolish harmful traditional practices affecting the health of children, particularly
girls, including.., female genital mutilation." Id. 30.
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control one's health and body, including sexual and reproductive
freedom, and the right to be free from interference, such as the
right to be free from torture, non-consensual medical treatment
and experimentation. '28' Accordingly, the CESCR has found
that States are "obliged ... to prevent third parties from coercing
women to undergo traditional practices, e.g. female genital
mutilation; and to take measures to protect all vulnerable or
marginalized groups of society, in particular women, children,
adolescents and older persons, in the light of gender-based
expressions of violence." 282 Indeed, in addressing the equal right
of men and women to the enjoyment of all economic, social and
cultural rights, the ESCR Committee has declared that states
must, at a minimum, remove "legal and other obstacles that
prevent men and women from accessing and benefiting from
health care on a basis of equality," which "includes . . . the
prohibition of female genital mutilation.' 2 3 Its concluding
observations also recognize 'the discriminatory nature of

281Id.

8.

282Id.

35.

283 U.N. Comm. on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Substantive
Issues Arising in the Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic,

Social and Cultural Rights: General Comment No. 16: Equal Right of Men and
Women to the Enjoyment of All Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (art. 3 of
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 29, U.N.
Doc. E/C.12/2005/4 (Aug. I1, 2005) [hereinafter U.N. Comm. on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, Gen. Comment 16].
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FGM, 284 which is consistent with the interpretation of the
Committee on the Rights of the Child. 285
Due to the discriminatory way in which it violates the right
to health, FGM represents a category 3 violation under
Hathaway's analysis, as well as category I and 2 violations.
FGM also constitutes a core violation of the right to health under
Foster's approach. The Human Rights Council, a relatively new
intergovernmental body within the UN, has emphasized
"protect[ing] and promot[ing] sexual and reproductive health as
integral elements of the right of everyone to the enjoyment of6
28
the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health."
Thus, far from lying at the periphery of the right to health,
sexual and reproductive well-being is at its center.
By addressing the multiplicity of harms associated with
FGM, including its discriminatory nature and the way in which
it violates individual autonomy, the U.N. Committees connect
the practice to a range of human rights violations, rather than
284 See, e.g., U.N. Comm. on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Articles 16 and 17
of the Covenant: Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights: Cameroon, 33, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/I/Add.40 (Dec.
8, 1999) [hereinafter U.N. Comm. on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
Rep.: Cameroon]; U.N. Comm. on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Articles 16 and 17
of the Covenant: Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights: Egypt, 13, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/I/Add.44 (May 23,
2000) [hereinafter U.N. Comm. on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Rep.:
Egypt]; U.N. Comm. on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Consideration of
Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant:
Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights: Nigeria, 39, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/lI/Add.23 (May 13, 1998) [hereinafter
U.N. Comm. on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Rep.: Nigeria].

285U.N. Comm. on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 7:
Implementing Rights in Early Childhood, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/GC/7/Rcv.I (Sept.
20, 2006) (recognizing FGM as a "serious" violation of the rights of the girl
child).
286 U.N. Human Rights Council, Resolution 6/29, 4(h) U.N. Doc. A/
HRC/Rcs/6/29 (Dec. 14, 2007) (emphasis added); id. 2(0 (encouraging the
Special Rapporteur to "continue to pay attention to sexual and reproductive
health as an integral element of the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the
highest attainable standard of physical and mental health").
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treating it as an isolated physical incident, which is how many
asylum adjudicators mistakenly view the practice. In other
words, drawing on the comments and observations of the UN
bodies that interpret human rights treaties would help asylum
adjudicators better understand that "[t]he human rights of
women include their right to have control over and decide freely
and responsibly on matters related to their sexuality, including
sexual and reproductive health, free of coercion, discrimination
287
and violence."
2. Applying a Human Rights Analysis
Involuntary IUDs

to

If we examine the issue of involuntary insertion of an IUD
under international human rights law, different aspects of the
harm emerge that may not be immediately apparent to an asylum
adjudicator. The issue of involuntary IUDs has not received
nearly as much international attention as FGM, so there isn't the
same level of guidance from the U.N. committees as to whether
this practice violates the prohibition on torture and cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment. While the U.N. Committee
Against Torture has expressed concern at reports of women
undergoing involuntary sterilization 288 and has recommended
that states parties investigate such claims, 289 it has not directly
addressed the issue of involuntary IUDs. Similarly, the Human
Rights Committee requires information about state parties'
actions to prevent forced sterilizations in order to assess their
compliance with Article 7 of the ICCPR, but it has not

287Report of the Fourth Conference on Women, Beijing, Sept. 4-15, 1995,
Beijing Declaration and Platform of Action, T 96, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.177/20/
Rev.I (1997) [hereinafter Beijing Declaration and Platform of Action].

288See U.N. Comm. Against Torture, Consideration of Reports Submitted
by States Parties Under Articles 19 of the Convention: Conclusions and
5(k),
Recommendations of the Committee Against Torture: Czech Republic,
U.N. Doc. CAT/C/CR/32/2 (June 3, 2004) [hereinafter Comm. Against Torture
Rep.: Czech Republic]; U.N. Comm. Against Torture, Consideration of Reports
Submitted by States Parties Under Articles 19 of the Convention: Conclusions
and Recommendations of the Committee Against Torture: Peru, 23, U.N. Doc.
CAT/C/PER/CO/4 (July 25, 2006).
289 Comm. Against Torture Rep.: Czech Republic, supra, note 288,

6(n).

COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF GENDER AND LAW

specifically addressed whether involuntary insertion of an IUD
violates Article 7.290
Some of the Human Rights Committee's comments,
however, certainly support the argument that involuntary
insertion of an IUD violates Article 7, which not only prohibits
torture and cruel inhuman or degrading treatment, but goes on to
state, "[i]n particular, no one shall be subjected without his free
consent to medical or scientific experimentation. '291 In
condemning the forced sterilization of Romani women in
Slovakia, the Human Rights Committee has invoked both the
right to informed consent under Article 7 and the right to equal
protection/non-discrimination under Article 26.292 The same
reasoning should apply to involuntary insertion of an IUD,
which also violates the informed consent provision of Article 7
and therefore represents a "category 1" violation under
Hathaway's approach, constituting persecution. It makes no
difference that involuntary IUDs are generally inserted in a
medical setting, since the Human Rights Committee has stressed
293
that Article 7's prohibitions apply in "medical institutions."

2190U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comments Adopted by the
Human Rights Committee Under Article 40, Paragraph 4, of the International
Covenant on the Civil and Political Rights: General Comment No. 28: Equality
of Rights Between men and Women (Artiele 3), U.N. DOC. CCPR/C/21/Rev.I/
Add.10 (Mar. 29, 2000).
291 ICCPR, supra note 243, art. 7 (emphasis added). Cf Convention of the
Prevention of Genocide, art. 11(d), Dec. 9, 1948, 377 U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into
force Jan. 12, 1951) (stating that genocide includes "[ilmposing measures
intended to prevent births within the group").
292 See U.N. Human Rights Comm., Consideration of Reports Submitted
by States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant: Observations of the Human
12, U.N. DOC. CCPR/CO/78/SVK (Aug. 22,
Rights Committee: Slovakia,

2003); see also INT'L FED. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, COMMENTS TO THE FOURTH
PERIODIC REPORT OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC: ON PERFORMANCE OF THE
OBLIGATIONS ARISING FROM THE CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL
FORMS OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN 4-12 (2008), available at http://

www2.ohchr.org/english/bodics/ccdaw/docs/ngos/CFIDH_Slovakia_4 I.pdf.
293 U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment 20: Article 7
(Prohibition of Torture, or Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment of
Punishment): Replaces General Comment No. 7, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/l/Rev.9
(Vol. 1) (Mar. 10, 1992).
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Even if there is no violation of non-derogable Article 7,
however, involuntary insertion of an IUD clearly violates several
of the derogable rights in the ICCPR, most notable Article 17's
prohibition on arbitrary or unlawful interference with privacy
and family, and Article 23, which affirms the right of men and
women to found a family.294 Even if we assume that China's
population problems create an emergency situation that permits
derogation, the discriminatory nature of requiring women to use
IUD's means that China is violating its obligations. 295 While
China's "[p]opulation control regulations routinely repeat that
'both spouses have the obligation to practice planned birth,'...
the policy fails to insure male participation. 2 96 According to a
2001 survey, 46% of women in China use IUDs and 38.1% have
been sterilized. 297 By comparison, only 5.1% of Chinese men
use condoms and only 7.9% have been sterilized. 298 Thus,
women disproportionately bear the burden of implementing
China's population control policies.

294

1CCPR, supra note 243, art. 17 ("No one shall be subjected to arbitrary
or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to
unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation."); ICCPR, art. 23.2 ("The right of
men and women of marriageable age to marry and to found a family shall be
recognized.").
295 Id. at art. 4(I) (stressing that derogation during a public emergency
must not "involve discrimination solely on the ground of race, color, sex,
language, religion or social origin").
296 Human Rights in China, Caught Between Tradition and the State:
Violations of the Human Rights of Chinese Women, 17 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP.
285, 296 (1996) (providing an abridged version of report released by Human
Rights in China that marks the Fourth World Conference on Women, Beijing).
297

Kristina Sivclle, Every Woman s Choice-Chinese Women, Birth

Control, and the Contraceptive Pill,

ALL CHINA'S WOMEN'S FED. (Nov. 10,

2006), http://www.womenofchina.cn/html/report/82797- I .htm.
298Id.; see also Chinese Men Shy Away Firn Birth Control, ALL CHINA
WOMEN'S FED. (June 2, 2010), http://www.womenofchina.cn/html/rcport/
105336-l.htm (stating that the rate of condom use across China is just 4.9%, and
only 37.5 million men have had vasectomies compared to 221.5 million women
who have undergone tubal ligation; finding that women bear nearly 90% of the
responsibility for using contraceptive measure among couples of childbearing
age).

COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF GENDER AND LAW

Interestingly, in its General Comments, the Human Rights
Committee has analyzed reproductive rights largely through the
lens of the right to privacy. For example, in discussing women's
right to equality in exercising their privacy rights, the Human
Rights Committee has expressed concern over requirements that
women have a certain number of children, that they have a
husband's authorization, or that they meet age requirements in
order to undergo sterilization. 299 The Human Rights Committee
has called on states to report on and eliminate such laws and
policies that interfere with women's equal enjoyment of the right
to privacy. 300 Thus, the Human Rights Committee has applied an
equal protection analysis to the right to privacy, rather than
treating it simply as impermissible sex-based discrimination
under Article 26 of the ICCPR. By focusing on the right to
privacy, the Human Rights Committee's analysis resembles how
the Supreme Court has addressed reproductive rights issues, as
discussed below. 30' However, by recognizing the inequality
aspect of the rights violation, the Committee actually goes
further than the Supreme Court, which has yet to invoke equality
principles in striking down restrictions on reproductive freedom.
The discriminatory nature of involuntary IUDs makes this
practice not only a category 2 violation of the ICCPR under
Hathaway's approach, but also a category 3 violation of the
ICESCR. The ESCR Committee's General Comment 16 clearly
considers legal restrictions on reproductive health services as a
form of discrimination against women. 30 2 As a "discriminatory
practice[] relating to women's health status and needs,"
299U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment 28: Article 3 (The
Equality of Rights Between Men and Women): Replaces General Comment No.
4, 20, U.N. Doc. No. HRI/GEN/l/Rcv.9 (Vol. 1) (Mar. 29, 2000).
3

00Id.

301See infra Part IICI.C.I.
302U.N. Comm. on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Gen. Comment
16, supra note 283. For conclusions of the UNCESCR interpreting General
Comment 16 in particular national contexts see, e.g., U.N. Comm. on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights Rep.: Cameroon, supra note 284, 33; U.N. Comm.
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Rep.: Egypt, supra note 284,
13;
U.N. Comm. on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Rep.: Nigeria, supra note
284, 39.
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violate the basic duty to
involuntary insertion of IUDs30 would
"respect" the right to health. 3 The obligation to respect the
right to health also includes refraining "from applying coercive
medical treatments. ' 30 4 While the ESCR Committee has
expressed concern over forced sterilization of women and forced
abortions as coercive medical treatments, it has yet to address
directly the issue of involuntary IUDs. 305 However, the same
reasoning that led the Committee to conclude that "States should
refrain from limiting access to contraceptives and other means of
maintaining sexual and reproductive health" supports the
argument that States should refrain from forcing women to use
certain invasive forms of contraception, since such coercive
"preventing people's
measures violate the right to health 30by
6
participation in health-related matters."
Like the ESCR Committee, the CEDAW Committee has
drawn particular attention to the problem of discrimination in the
areas of family planning and pregnancy. 30 7 In finding that
coercive implementation of population policies and family
planning programs are a form of violence against women, the
303Id. at
34

0

34

Id.

305 See, e.g., U.N. Comm. on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Articles 16 and 17
of the Covenant: Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights: Brazil, 27, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/I/Add.87 (May 23,
2003); U.N. Comm. on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Consideration of
Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant:
Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights: People's Republic of China (including Hong Kong and Macao), 27,
U.N. DoC. E/C.12/1/Add.107 (May 13, 2005).
306 U.N. Comm. on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General
Comment No. 14: Substantive Issues Arising in the Implementation of the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: The Right to
the Highest Attainable Standard of Health (Article 12 of the International
34, U.N. Doc. E/C.
Covenant 'on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights),
12/2000/4 (Aug. II, 2000).
307 U.N. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women,
General Recommendation 24: Article 12: Women and Health, 2, U.N. Doc. A/
54/38/Rev.1 ch. I (Feb. 5, 1999) [hereinafter U.N. Comm. on the Elimination of
Discrimination Against Women: Gen. Rec. 24].
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CEDAW Committee has emphasized the principles of equality
and reproductive choice,30 noting that "the equal rights of
women and men to decide freely and responsibly on the number
and spacing of children are fundamental to women's rights in
marriage. 30 9 In response to reports of forced pregnancies,
abortions, and sterilizations, the Committee has stressed that
"[djecisions to have children or not, while preferably made in
consultation with spouse or partner, must not nevertheless be

limited by spouse, parent, partner or Government.

'310

In fact, in

A.S. v. Hungary, a case that involved the involuntary sterilization
of a Hungarian woman of Roma origin, the CEDAW Committee
found that the failure to provide the woman with reproductive
health information and to ensure that A.S. gave her full and
informed consent to be sterilized violated her most basic human

rights, including the rights to non-discrimination in the fields of
education (Article 10(h)) and healthcare (Article 12), as well as

308Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Rep. on
274, 299(b),
its 20th and 21st Sess. Jan 19-Feb. 5, 1999, June 7-25, 1999,
U.N. Doc. A/54/38/Rev.l; GAOR, 54th Sess., Supp. No. 38 (1999) (reporting on
China).
309U.N. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women:
Gen. Rec. 24, supra note 307, 28. Sources of "soft law" also stress the role of
self-determination in family planning and sexual health as an essential part of
reproductive health care. See, e.g., Beijing Declaration and Platform of Action,
supra note 287, 96 (t]he human rights of women include their right to have
control over and decide freely and responsibly on matters related to their
sexuality, including sexual and reproductive health, free of coercion,
discrimination and violence.").
310U.N. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women,
General Recommendation 21: Equality in Marriage and Family Relations, 22,
U.N. Doc. A/49/38 (Apr. 12, 1994); see also U.N. Comm. on the Elimination of
Discrimination Against Women, Concluding Observations of the Committee on
23-24,
the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women: Czech Republic,
U.N. Doc. CEDW/C/CZE/CO/5 (Oct. 22, 2010) (expressing concern regarding
the sterilization of women without informed consent and calling for adoption of
legislative changes regarding forced sterilization, as well as mandatory trainings
on patients' rights and compensation of victims of coercive sterilization).
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the right to determine the number and spacing of one's children
(Article 16(l)(e)).311
Turning to Michelle Foster's approach of focusing on the
core and periphery of a given right, it is worth noting that the
ESCR Committee has identified the core obligations that arise
from the right to health as including the "right of access to
healthcare facilities without discrimination" and the "equitable
distribution of all health facilities, goods and services." 312 These
minimum core obligations are non-derogable, such that "a State
party cannot, under any circumstances whatsoever, justify its
non-compliance with the core obligations. '3 13 In enumerating
other obligations "of comparable priority" to minimum core
obligations, the ESCR Committee includes "ensur[ing]
reproductive . . . health care." 314

Thus, equitable access to

reproductive healthcare lies at the core of the right to health.
The above discussion shows that the main U.N. treaty
bodies-the Human Right Committee, the ESCR Committee,
and the CEDAW Committee-have all recognized the
discriminatory aspects of restrictions on women's reproductive
functions. Drawing on the interpretations of these committees, a
compelling argument exists for finding that forced IUDs
constitute a serious violation of human rights rising to the level
of persecution.

311 U.N. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women,
Views Communication No. 4/2004: Views on the Elimination of Discrimination
Against Women Under Article 7, Paragraph 3, of the Optional Protocol to the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women,
11.2-11.4, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/36/D4/2004 (Aug. 29, 2006).

312 U.N. Comm. on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General
Comment No. 14: Substantive Issues Arising in the Implementation of the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: The Right to
the Highest Attainable Standard of Health (Article 12 of the International
43, U.N. Doc. E/C.
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights),
12/2000/4 (Aug. 1I,2000).
313
Id. 47.
314Id. 44. As noted above, the Human Rights Council has also found
sexual and reproductive rights to be "integral" to the right to health. See U.N.
Human Rights Council, Resolution 6/29, supra note 286.
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C. Alternatives to a Human Rights Approach
1.

Violations of Fundamental Rights As
Persecution

If U.S. adjudicators are reluctant to draw on international
human rights norms in analyzing persecution, an indirect way of
incorporating some of the same principles would be to at least
remain mindful of "fundamental rights" under U.S.
constitutional law. Just as human dignity and self-determination
are core concepts of human rights law, many fundamental rights
derive from the principle of respect for individual dignity and
autonomy, including rights related to sexuality and reproduction.
In Planned Parenthoodof Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,
for example, the Supreme Court found it "settled ... that the
constitution places limits on a State's right to interfere with a
person's most basic decisions about family and parenthood..
as well as bodily integrity."315 The Court went on to explain:
Our law affords constitutional protection to
personal decisions relating to marriage,
procreation, contraception, family
relationships, childrearing, and education....
These matters, involving the most intimate and
personal choices a person may make in a
lifetime, choices central to personal dignity
and autonomy, are central to the liberty
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At
the heart of liberty is the right to define one's
own concept of existence, of meaning of3 the
t6
universe, and of the mystery of human life.
Similarly, in Lawrence v. Texas, where the Court protected
sexual freedom by striking down sodomy laws that criminalized
same-sex acts, Justice Stevens, writing for the majority,
acknowledged that "adults may choose to enter upon this

315 Planned Parenthood of Southeastem Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 849

(1992).
316

Id. at 851 (emphasis added).
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own private
relationship in the confines of their homes and their
317
lives and still retain their dignity as free persons."
Asylum adjudicators should, at minimum, acknowledge
that actions such as forced IUDs and FGM (in situations where
the State is unable or unwilling to stop the practice) violate
fundamental rights to make life's most intimate choices. The
elevated position of these rights under U.S. constitutional law
signals the severity of the harm associated with restricting or
impeding them. While U.S. courts have not yet drawn on the
concept of fundamental rights in analyzing persecution,
Canada's Federal Court has done so in rejecting its Immigration
and Refugee Board's finding that forced usage of an IUD does
not constitute persecution.31 8 Specifically, in dismissing the
Board's reasoning that forced usage of an IUD was not
persecution because it was "a law of general application," the
Federal Court relied on decisions finding that "a woman's
reproductive liberty is a basic right ranking high on our scale of
values."31 9 Unlike the BIA, the Federal Court of Canada did not
require the presence of any "aggravating factors" for forced
usage of an IUD to amount to persecution. If the United States
were to follow Canada's example and consider the fundamental
nature of the rights being violated, as articulated by the Supreme
Court, adjudicators would be more likely to see the
corresponding severity of the harm resulting from the violation.
Examining the violation of fundamental rights in analyzing
persecution may seem like a strange proposition to most US
jurists, but there are at least two reasons why doing so might
make sense. First, as Kenji Yoshino discusses in his article on
The New Equal Protection, our country is plagued by pluralism
anxiety, the sense that there are "too many groups" and that

3 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003) (emphasis added).
318Zheng v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), [2009] F.C.
327, 1 13 (Can. Ont.).

13-14. The Court stressed that the state's ability to "legislate in
319Id.
the area of family planning and population control [was] not the issue"; what
mattered was "the means by which the state's objectives are achieved ....The
more coercive or physically intrusive the approach the more likely it is that the
state's conduct will be seen to be perseeutory." Id. T 13.
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these groups are splintering the nation. 320 This pluralism anxiety
manifests acutely in the asylum context, where judges fear
opening the floodgates to a seemingly endless array of sundry
individuals fearing persecution based on race, religion,
nationality, political opinion, or the terrifyingly vague
"particular social group." Yoshino describes how the US
Supreme Court has dealt with its own pluralism anxiety by
"shift[ing] from its traditional equal protection jurisprudence
toward a liberty-based dignity jurisprudence." 32' He notes that
the liberty-based analysis has created new ways to vindicate the
equality concerns of groups such as women and gays by
"fram[ing] rights at a high [] level of generality" 322 and
"focus[ing] on rights that sound in a universal register, '323 rather
than stressing the distinctions that underlie equal protection
claims. Similarly, bringing a focus on fundamental rights into
the analysis of "persecution" in asylum cases may mollify the
fear of "too many groups" invoked by the "particular social
group" portion of the refugee definition.
Moreover, this shift in focus would force adjudicators to
"imagine a world in which they are denied the right," 324 which
could possibly help shift their perspectives from cognitively
skewed comparisons to extreme forms of harm to a more
objective assessment of a given form of harm. Another
advantage of a liberty-based dignity analysis which Yoshino
notes is that it is less likely to essentialize the identity of group
32 5
members and thereby propagate stereotypes about them.
Numerous scholars have sharply critiqued the role of such
stereotypes in the presentation and adjudication of asylum cases,
which commonly perpetuate "an essentialized narrative of
320 Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747

(2011).
321 Id.

at 802.

322Id. at

794.

323Id. at

793.

324Id. at

794.

325 Id.

at 795.
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persecution. '326 A fundamental-rights perspective could help
transform the current situation by shifting the focus to the nature
of the rights-violation rather than the identity of the asylum
applicant.
While focusing on fundamental rights has these potential
advantages, one of its main drawbacks is that it would not lead
to as comprehensive an analysis of harm as applying human
rights law. Certainly, the liberty-based dignity analysis smacks
of universal human rights, with some U.S. Supreme Court cases
looking explicitly at international and comparative law, 327 but
international human rights law goes beyond a U.S. liberty-based
dignity analysis in some important respects. For example,
nondiscrimination is a core concept in international human rights
law, but falls out of the picture when courts shift from an
equality focus to a liberty focus. While not talking or thinking
about discrimination may help assuage anxiety, it can also leave
out a critical aspect of someone's claim, especially in cases
involving sexual and reproductive harm.
326 Sarah Hinger, Finding the Fundamental: Shaping Identity in Gender
and Sexual Orientation Based Asylum Claims, 19 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 367,
402 (2010). Specifically, Hingcr observes that "an applicant must anticipate and
perform certain stereotypes in her own application as the surest means of gaining
asylum." Id. at 389. Further, she argues that "[c]ourts have reacted by asserting
the fundamental, universal nature of the identity and an csscntializcd narrative of
persecution." Id. at 402. See also Susan Musarrat Akram, Orientalism Revisited
in Asylum and Refugee Claims, 12 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 7 (2000) (discussing
how advocates and judges perpetuate stereotypes about Muslims and Middle
Eastern society in asylum and refugee cases, such as the belief that there are
"such things as an Islamic society, an Arab mind, an Oriental psyche."); Deborah
A. Morgan, Not Gay Enough for the Government: Racial and Sexual Stereotypes
in Sexual Orientation Asylum Cases, 15 LAW & SEXUALITY 135, 147 (2006)
(discussing how factors such as "membership in gay organizations, subscriptions
to gay publications, and participation in gay pride parades" may play a greater
role in gaining asylum than testimony about the applicant's personal plight);
Jacqueline Bhabha, Internationalist Gatekeepers?: The Tension Between Asylum
Advocacy and Human Rights, 15 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 155, 162-63 (2002)
(describing the difficulty of "advancing asylum claims on behalf of claimants
who do not fit the prevailing stereotype, such as women who experienced
persecution "based on activist modes of behavior" rather than as "submissive,
voiceless victims").

327See Yoshino, surpa note 320 (noting that several of the "paradigmatic
examples of the 'new equal protection' look to international and comparative
law, including the cases of Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), Atkins v.
Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005)).
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As Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg explained decades ago
when she was a federal appeals court judge, the Supreme Court
"has treated reproductive autonomy under a substantive due
process/personal autonomy headline riot expressly linked to
discrimination against women. '328 Starting with its 1965
decision in Griswold v. Connecticut, the Supreme Court linked
reproductive rights to the right to privacy rather than the right to
equality. Specifically, the Court struck down Connecticut's ban
against the use of contraceptives as an infringement of the right
to marital privacy. 329 The Court later extended its reasoning to
unmarried couples in Eisenstadt v. Baird.330 In 1973, the Court
issued its groundbreaking decision in Roe v. Wade, basing the
right to an abortion on principles of patient-physician autonomy
and privacy, rather than gender equality. 331 Likewise, the Court
has linked sexual rights to privacy instead of equality. In
Lawrence v. Texas, mentioned above, the majority opinion
stressed that the sodomy laws at issue touched upon "the most
private human conduct, sexual behavior, and in the most private
of places, the home. '332
The Court did not base this decision on
333
principles of equality.
Justice Ginsburg has aptly criticized this line of reasoning
grounded in the notion of privacy. Her dissent in Gonzales v.
Carhart,a 2007 case involving partial-birth abortions, explicitly

328 Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in
Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. REV. 375, 376 (1985).
329Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-86 (1965). The Court later
struck down a ban forbidding uninarried couples from using contraceptives
under the Equal Protection Clause. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972). In
Carey v. Population Servs. hIt'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977), the Court found that
constitutional protection also extended to the sale and distribution of
contraceptives.

330 Eisenstadt,405 U.S. 438.
331 Roe

v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).

332 Lawrence, 539

U.S. at 567.

333 id. ("It suffices for us to acknowledge that adults may choose to enter
upon this relationship in the confines of their homes and their own private lives
and still retain their dignity as free persons.").
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connects a woman's right to autonomy to her right to equality. 334
Drawing on Casey's language regarding a woman's "control
over her [own] destiny," Justice Ginsburg wrote:
Women, it is now acknowledged, have the
talent, capacity, and right to "participate
equally in the economic and social life of the
Nations." . . . Their ability to realize their full
potential, the Court recognized, is intimately
connected to "their ability to control their
reproductive lives." . . . Thus, legal challenges
to undue restrictions on abortion procedures
do not seek to vindicate some generalized
notion of privacy; rather, they center on a
woman's autonomy to determine her life's
course, and thus to enjoy equal citizenship
335
stature.
Her dissent in Carhart echoes her earlier criticism that the
reasoning of Roe was weakened "by the opinion's concentration
on a medically approved autonomy idea, to the exclusion of a
constitutionally based sex-equality perspective. ' 336 In the same
way that medicalizing the reproductive rights issues in Roe led
the Court to lose sight of the equality principle, the BIA's
myopic focus on the extent of physical injury and medical
complications in cases involving FGM and involuntary IUDs
masks the underlying harm of sex discrimination. Focusing on
fundamental rights, as the U.S. Supreme Court currently views
them, would not remedy this situation. As Yoshino notes, the
"risk of effacing enduring forms of group-based subordination"
may be particularly high "in contexts where differences between

334Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 172 (2007).
335Id. at 171-72 (citations omitted).
336 Ginsburg, supra note 328, at 386; see also Cass Sunstein, Op-Ed.,

Ginsburg's Dissent May Yet Prevail, L.A. TIMEs, Apr. 20, 2007, available at
http://articles.latimes.com/2007/apr/20/opinion/oe-sunstein20/; Yoshino, supra
note 320, at 799 (noting that "[t]he Carhart decision . . . still stands as a
cautionary tale against the dangers of a liberty-based dignity jurisprudence").
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and differentiating, as in
the relevant groups are both persistent
337
the contexts of sex or disability.
Losing sight of the role of discrimination in asylum cases
would be particularly problematic because U.S. case law clearly
recognizes that severe discrimination may amount to
persecution, whereas the BIA and circuit courts have yet to find
persecution based on a serious violation of privacy. Moreover,
since the right to privacy remains relatively vague, under both
international human rights law and U.S. constitutional law, the
extent of the harm may remain hidden or elusive when
characterized as a violation of this right. Discrimination, on the
other hand, is a clearer concept, making the resulting harm easier
for adjudicators to recognize and evaluate. Accordingly, in
analyzing practices that interfere with women's sexual and
reproductive rights, asylum adjudicators should pay attention to
the discriminatory context in which these acts occur and the
particular impact that they have on women, rather than viewing
them as isolated events. Relying on the U.S. Supreme Court's
interpretation of fundamental rights is therefore of limited use
only; it helps expose some types of nonphysical harm that
currently go unnoticed in asylum cases (e.g. violations of the
right to privacy, autonomy, and dignity) but reinforces omission
of other types of nonphysical harm, such as sex-based
discrimination.
2.

Bifurcated Standards: Nonphysical and
Physical Harm

Another approach to addressing the failure of asylum
adjudicators to consider nonphysical forms of harm may be to
create separate, specific standards for determining when
different types of harm amount to persecution. As noted above,
the BIA's decision in T-Z- provides some guidance in evaluating
economic harm but does not do much to help clarify the standard
for other forms of nonphysical harm. Thus, a cursory review of
the case law may suggest that what is needed is a clear standard
for evaluating emotional harm, One area of law in which such
different standards exist is tort law, which has traditionally
drawn a "dichotomy ...between physical harm and emotional
"I Yoshino, supra notc

320, at 799.
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harm. '338 However, as Martha Chamallashas argues, this split
reflects "a hierarchy of values that privileges physical injury
over emotional and relational harm" 339 and "tend[s] to place
women at a disadvantage because important and recurring
injuries in women's lives are more often
classified as lower340
ranked emotional or relational harms."
Moreover, the pattern that has emerged in both tort law and
asylum law is that judges tend to look for physical harm even
when severe nonphysical harm is present. For example, many
states have imposed a "physical manifestation" requirement to
recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress, 34' a tort
that often implicates "fundamental rights of sexual autonomy,
reproductive choice, and intimate family relationships. '3 42 In
much the same way, the BIA has focused only on the extent of
physical injury and the presence of "aggravating factors," such
as pain and medical complications, in determining whether FGM
and involuntary IUDs amount to persecution, although these
practices also involve serious nonphysical harm. While the
trajectory in tort law is to move away from this physical
manifestation requirement, 343 it appears that the BIA is actually
moving closer to it by ignoring emotional harm in its analysis of
persecution and arbitrarily requiring the presence of
"aggravating factors" for certain types of harm to amount to
persecution.
This trajectory in asylum law must change. The human
rights approach to analyzing persecution, discussed above, sets
338 Martha Chamallas, Unpacking Emotional Distress: Sexual
Exploitation,Reproductive Harm,and FundamentalRights, 44 WAKE FOREST L.
REv. 1109, 1110 (2009).
339Id.

340Id.
341Id.at 1113.

342 Id. at II11.
343 As Chamallas notes, the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 46(b)

(Tentative Draft No. 5, 2007) rejects the physical manifestation requirement. Id.
at 1113.
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forth a practical and meaningful standard for determining
whether any type of harm-physical or nonphysical-amounts
to persecution. Following this single, unified approach would be
more comprehensive, consistent, and equitable than having
separate standards for analyzing physical and nonphysical harm,
or possibly even different tests for different types of nonphysical
harm (e.g. economic harm vs. emotional harm). Many types of
harm have both physical and nonphysical components, and it is
all too easy for adjudicators to focus on the former and neglect
the latter unless they are looking for violations of particular
rights. By presenting a "catalogue" of potential violations, the
major human rights treaties help highlight all types of harm.
Establishing different standards for different types of harm
also would not address the problem of "raising the bar" for
physical harm in certain types of cases. The way in which this
tends to happen in cases involving sexual and reproductive harm
is visible in tort law as well as asylum law. For example, in
2001, a Maryland court found in Robinson v. Cutchin that the
involuntary sterilization of a black woman through tubal ligation
after a C-section was not a battery, reasoning that it "was not
harmful because it did not cause any additional physical pain,
injury, or illness other than that occasioned by the C-section
procedure." 344 The court completely failed to recognize the loss
of reproductive functions itself as a form of physical harm, just
as the BIA has failed to recognize the serious harm caused by
forced IUD usage without the presence of "aggravating factors"
such as pain and bleeding. The court in Cutchin even concluded
that the sterilization was not something that should offend the
plaintiff's "reasonable sense of personal dignity" simply because
she already had six children. 345 As Chamallas points out, the
court's decision in this case "reveals a disconcerting tendency to
devalue the plaintiff's procreative interests and to minimize her

344 Robinson v. Cutchin, 140 F. Supp. 2d 488, 493 (D. Md. 2001).
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suffering.' '346 These are the same blindspots 347that we see in
asylum decisions evaluating reproductive harm.
These examples from tort law suggest that creating
separate standards to analyze when various types of harm
amount to persecution is unlikely to address the concerns raised
in this article. To begin with, the physical and nonphysical
components in cases involving sexual and reproductive harm are
often closely intertwined, and it would be a Herculean task to
tease them apart in order to apply different standards to each
aspect of the harm. A human rights analysis provides the most
holistic approach by considering all aspects of the harm in a
cohesive manner. Indeed, in discussing violence against women,
the CEDAW Committee has explicitly blurred any boundaries
between different types of harm, defining gender-based violence
as "violence that is directed against a woman because she is a
woman or that affects women disproportionately" and specifying
that it "includes acts that inflict physical, mental or sexual harm
or suffering, threats of such acts, coercion and other deprivations
of liberty. '348 By integrating mental and physical harm into the
definition of violence, the CEDAW Committee avoids creating a
hierarchy of harms that privileges the physical. Integrating
different types of harms in this way helps ensure gender equality
in asylum adjudications.
CONCLUSION
The foundation for following a human rights approach to
analyzing gender-related persecution already exists in the United
States. In fact, the INS Gender Guidelines, issued in 1995,
specifically provide that "[t]he evaluation of gender-based
claims must be viewed within the framework provided by
346

Chamallas, supra note 338, at 1129.

347 Perhaps the United States' own history of sterilizing poor women has
numbed adjudicators to the harm related to restrictions on women's reproductive
functions. Chamallas discusses how, "prior to the late 1970s, the practice of
performing unnecessary hysterectomies and tubal ligations on poor women
without their knowledge or consent was widespread in the North as well as in the
Deep South." Id. at 1123.
348 U.N. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women,
Gen. Rec. 19, supra note 275, 6 (emphasis added),
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existing international human rights instruments and the
interpretation of these instruments by international
organizations. ' 349 Adjudicators simply have not followed this
approach in an explicit or consistent way. While the traditional
understanding of persecution as "serious harm" may be
sufficient to evaluate many forms of violence against women,
such as rape and severe forms of FGM, the inherent vagueness
of this standard, which turns on a particular adjudicator's idea of
what actions are harmful, will not serve as a solid bridge to
analyzing the more complex questions that are emerging in the
case law. The existence of salient precedents involving extreme
forms of gender-related harm compounds the problem by
creating contrast effects that skew adjudicators' judgments
regarding the severity of less extreme forms of harm.
As this Article has shown, differences in opinion are
already apparent regarding the level of harm associated with
Type I FGM and involuntary IUDs. Other pressing issues that
may soon require precedent decisions include forced marriages
and draconian family laws governing divorce and custody of
children. 350 In order to properly address these issues,
adjudicators need better tools to perform a comprehensive
analysis of physical and nonphysical harm. Indeed, in the case of
discriminatory laws that deprive women of custody of their
children, the harm may be exclusively nonphysical yet quite
severe. Similarly, as the UNHCR has recognized, criminal laws
prohibiting same-sex consensual relations between adults, even
if not enforced, are relevant to the analysis of persecution
because they "have been found to be both discriminatory and to
constitute a violation of the right to privacy." 351 Indeed, the
UNHCR has gone even further, stating, "[a] law can be
considered persecutory per se, for instance, where it reflects
349 Memorandum from Phyllis Coven, Office of Int'l Affairs, U.S. Dep't
of Justice to All I.N.S. Office/rs, HQASM Coordinators (May 26, 1995),
available at http://cgrs.uchastings.cdu/documcnts/legal/guidelincs-us.pdf.
350 See, e.g., Krivcnko, supra note 4 (discussing claims to refugee status
presented by divorced Muslim women around issues of child custody and
divorce).
351 U.N. HIGH COMM'N ON REFUGEES, GUIDANCE NOTE ON REFUGEE
CLAIMS RELATING TO SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND GENDER IDENTITY,

available at http://www.unhcr.org/rcfworld/pdfid/48abd5660.pdf.

17 (2008),
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social or cultural norms which are not in conformity with
international human rights standards." 35 2 Thus, the UNHCR has
placed enormous emphasis on discrimination as a form of
persecution, a standard that, while recognized in the United
States, is not rigorously applied.
Canada and New Zealand have taken the lead in finding
persecution in cases brought by women involving primarily nonphysical harm, 353 but the United States will likely lag behind
unless it develops a more nuanced and comprehensive method of
analyzing all types of harm. This Article has argued that
international human rights law provides such a method. While a
human rights approach is by no means perfect and certainly has
gray areas of its own, it still provides a more comprehensive
framework of analysis than the current U.S. approach and would
lead to more consistent interpretations of persecution not only
among U.S. courts, but also among all of the asylum-granting
countries throughout the world. If U.S. adjudicators want to take
more gradual steps towards this approach, they could combine
an international human rights analysis that highlights the
importance of discrimination with one based on the fundamental
rights protected by our own Constitution, much as Canada looks
to both international law and its Charter of Rights and
Freedoms.354

While, in some cases, international human rights law can
provide an immediate answer regarding whether a particular
harm such as FGM constitutes persecution, in other situations,
such as involuntary insertion of IUDs, applying international
human rights law will simply provide deeper insight into the
analysis of the harm and help ensure that the cumulative harm is
considered. Reproductive harm represents an area where refugee
law and human rights law could truly help push each other
forward in developing a more sophisticated analysis of the rights
at stake. As noted above, none of the UN treaty bodies have
directly addressed the issue of involuntary JUDs. Asylum
decisions finding forced IUDs to constitute persecution may
35 2

Id.

18.

353See Krivcnko, supra note 4.
354Id.
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therefore help set the stage for the Human Rights Committee to
find that the practice violates Article 2's prohibition against
torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment.
Since human rights have been traditionally defined
"according to what men fear will happen to them," its norms
often "obscure the most pervasive harms done to women.' 355 We
have seen the same problem surface in asylum cases, where
adjudicators often focus on the types of physical harm feared by
men and shy away from harm related to female sexuality and
reproductive rights. While great strides have been made in
recognizing certain forms of gender-related harm as persecution,
recent cases remind us that we are still at the early stages of this
effort and may even be slipping backwards with respect to issues
such as FGM. The focus of many scholars writing about genderrelated asylum has turned to other challenging areas, such as
showing that the persecution is on account of a protected
ground; that it was performed by the state or private individuals
whom the state was unable or unwilling to control; and the
assessment of well-founded fear, especially in cases where the

355Hilary Charlcsworth & Christine Chinkin, The Gender of Jus Cogens,
15 HUM. RTS. Q. 63, 69-70 (1993). According to one rights group, "[diespite
two decades of sustained effort, sexual and reproductive rights are poorly
understood and articulated." See generally REALISING RIGHTS, http://
www.realising-rights.org/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2011). Other groups have a more
optimistic outlook, noting that the human rights norms that support reproductive
rights continue to develop as "global recognition and understanding of those
rights are growing and deepening." CTR. FOR REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS, TWELVE
HUMAN RIGHTS KEY TO REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS 5, available a! http://
reproductiverights.org/sites/crr.civicactions.net/filcs/documcnts/V4Repro
%20Rights%2OAre%2OHuman%2ORights%20-%2OFINAL.pdf (last visited Oct.
9, 2011) (noting that the continued development of human rights norms
supporting rights is "evidenced by the recently adopted Yogyakarta Principles on
the Application of Human Rights Law in Relation to Sexual Orientation and
Gender Identity, agreed upon by twenty-nine human rights experts, and the Asian
Human Rights Charter, a civil society initiative aimed at laying the foundation
for a regional human rights treaty").
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harm is ongoing. 356 We must remember, however, that the core
concept of persecution also remains a-pressing issue. The time
has come for asylum law to push forward on some of the more
complex issues regarding persecution, drawing on international
human rights law in order to develop a coherent analysis of this
core concept in gender-related cases.

356

See, e.g., Karen Musalo, Revisiting Social Group and Nexus in Gender
Asylum Claims: A Unifying Rationale for Evolving Jurisprudence, 52 DE PAUL
L. REV. 777 (2008).
Hinger, supra note 326, at 368 (arguing that "the implicit search for fixed
and fundamental characteristics to identify a particular social group creates a
limited narrative of how identity is shaped and operates within culture"); Martina
Pomeroy, Left Out in the Cold: Trafficking Victims, Gender, and
Misinterpretation of the Refugee Convention's "Nexus" Requirement, 16 MICH.
J. GENDER & L. 453, 463-70, 476 (2010) (discussing the challenges in
establishing a protected ground in asylum cases involving trafficking and arguing
that the greatest hurdle in these cases is the nexus requirement); Allison W.
Reimann, Hope for the Future? The Asylum Claims of Women Fleeing Sexual
Holence in Guatemala, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1199, 1240-58 (2009) (discussing
why sexual violence against Guatemalan women constitutes persecution on
account of membership in a "particular social group"); Love, supra note 69, at
174-76 (discussing well-founded fear is situations that the author describes as
"unrepeatedable harms", including involuntary sterilization and FGM).

